Strong Types for Direct Logic by Hewitt, Carl
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Strong Types for Direct Logic 
 
Carl Hewitt 
http://plus.google.com/+CarlHewitt-StandardIoT 
 
This article is dedicated to Alonzo Church, 
Richard Dedekind, Stanisław Jaśkowski, Bertrand 
Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein. and Ernst Zermelo. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article follows on the introductory article “Direct Logic for Intelligent 
Applications” [Hewitt 2017a]. Strong Types enable new mathematical theorems 
to be proved including the Formal Consistency of Mathematics. Also, Strong 
Types are extremely important in Direct Logic because they block all known 
paradoxes[Cantini and Bruni 2017]. Blocking known paradoxes makes Direct 
Logic safer for use in Intelligent Applications by preventing security holes.  
 
Inconsistency Robustness is performance of information systems with pervasively 
inconsistent information.1 Inconsistency Robustness of the community of 
professional mathematicians is their performance repeatedly repairing 
contradictions over the centuries. In the Inconsistency Robustness paradigm, 
deriving contradictions has been a progressive development and not “game 
stoppers.” Contradictions can be helpful instead of being something to be “swept 
under the rug” by denying their existence, which has been repeatedly attempted 
by authoritarian theoreticians (beginning with some Pythagoreans). Such denial 
has delayed mathematical development. This article reports how considerations 
of Inconsistency Robustness have recently influenced the foundations of 
mathematics for Computer Science continuing a tradition developing the 
sociological basis for foundations.2 
 
Mathematics here means the common foundation of all classical mathematical 
theories from Euclid to the mathematics used to prove Fermat's Last [McLarty 
2010]. Direct Logic provides categorical axiomatizations of the Natural Numbers, 
Real Numbers, Ordinal Numbers, Set Theory, and the Lambda Calculus meaning 
that up a unique isomorphism there is only one model that satisfies the respective 
axioms. Good evidence for the consistency Classical Direct Logic derives from 
how it blocks the known paradoxes of classical mathematics. Humans have spent 
millennia devising paradoxes for classical mathematics. 
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Having a powerful system like Direct Logic is important in computer science 
because computers must be able to formalize all logical inferences (including 
inferences about their own inference processes) without requiring recourse to 
human intervention. Any inconsistency in Classical Direct Logic would be a 
potential security hole because it could be used to cause computer systems to 
adopt invalid conclusions. 
 
After [Church 1934], logicians faced the following dilemma: 
 1st order theories cannot be powerful lest they fall into inconsistency 
because of Church’s Paradox. 
 2nd order theories contravene the philosophical doctrine that theorems 
must be computationally enumerable. 
 
The above issues can be addressed by requiring Mathematics to be strongly typed 
using so that: 
 Mathematics self proves that it is “open” in the sense that theorems are 
not computationally enumerable.3 
 Mathematics self proves that it is formally consistent.4 
 Strong mathematical theories for Natural Numbers, Ordinals, Set 
Theory, the Lambda Calculus, Actors, etc. are inferentially decidable, 
meaning that every true proposition is provable and every proposition 
is either provable or disprovable.  Furthermore, theorems of these 
theories are not enumerable by a provably total procedure. 
 
Mathematical Foundation for Computer Science 
Computer Science brought different concerns and a new perspective to 
mathematical foundations including the following requirements:5 [Arabic numeral 
superscripts refer to endnotes at the end of this article] 
 provide powerful inference machinery so that arguments (proofs) can be short 
and understandable and all logical inferences can be formalized 
 establish standard foundations so people can join forces and develop common 
techniques and technology 
 incorporate axioms thought to be consistent by the overwhelming consensus of 
working professional mathematicians, e.g., natural numbers [Dedekind 1888], 
Actors, real numbers [Dedekind 1888], ordinals, sets, lambda calculus, etc. 
 facilitate inferences about the mathematical foundations used by computer 
systems. 
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Sociology of Foundations 
 
“Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that 
there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof.”   
John Kenneth Galbraith [1971 pg. 50] 
 
“Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Autobiography 
[Planck 1949], sadly remarked that ‘a new scientific truth does not 
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but 
rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows 
up that is familiar with it.’ ” [Kuhn 1962] 
 
The inherently social nature of the processes by which principles and propositions 
in logic are produced, disseminated, and established is illustrated by the following 
issues with examples:6 
 
 The formal presentation of a demonstration (proof) has not led 
automatically to consensus. Formal presentation in print and at several 
different professional meetings of the extraordinarily simple proof in this 
paper have not lead automatically to consensus about the theorem that 
“Mathematics proves that it is formally consistent”. New results can sound 
crazy to those steeped in conventional thinking. Paradigm shifts often 
happen because conventional thought is making assumptions taken as 
dogma.  As computer science continues to advance, such assumptions can 
get in the way and have to be discarded. 
 There has been an absence of universally recognized central logical 
principles. Disputes over the validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle 
led to the development of Intuitionistic Logic. 
 There are many ways of doing logic. One view of logic is that it is about 
truth; another view is that it is about argumentation (i.e. proofs).7  
 Argumentation and propositions have be variously (re-)connected and 
both have been re-used. Church's paradox [Church 1934] is that assuming 
theorems of mathematics are computationally enumerable leads to 
contradiction. In this article, Church’s Paradox is transformed into the 
fundamental principle that “Mathematics is Open” (i.e. it is a theorem of 
mathematics that the proofs of mathematics are not computationally 
enumerable).i 
                                                          
i See discussion in this article. 
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 New technological developments have cast doubts on traditional logical 
principles. The pervasive inconsistency of modern large-scale information 
systems has cast doubt on some logical principles, e.g., Excluded Middle.8 
That there are proofs that cannot be expressed through text alone, overturns 
a long-held philosophical dogma about mathematical theories, i.e., that all 
theorems of a theory can be computationally generated by starting with 
axioms and mechanically applying rules of inference 
 Political actions have been taken against views differing from the 
establishment theoreticians. According to [Kline 1990, p. 32], Hippasus 
was literally thrown overboard by his fellow Pythagoreans “…for having 
produced an element in the universe which denied the…doctrine that all 
phenomena in the universe can be reduced to whole numbers and their 
ratios.” Fearing that he was dying and the influence that Brouwer might have 
after his death, Hilbert fired9 Brouwer as an associate editor of 
Mathematische Annalen because of “incompatibility of our views on 
fundamental matters”10 e.g., Hilbert ridiculed Brouwer for challenging the 
validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle. [Gödel 1931] results were for 
Principia Mathematica as the foundation for the mathematics of its time 
including the categorical axiomatization of the natural numbers. In face of 
Wittgenstein's devastating criticism, Gödel insinuated11 that he was crazy 
and retreated to relational 1st order theory in an attempt to salvage his results. 
Since theoreticians found it difficult to prove anything significant about 
practical mathematical theories, they cut them down to unrealistic relational 
1st order theories where results could be proved (e.g. compactness) that did 
not hold for practical mathematical theories. In the famous words of Upton 
Sinclair:  
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something,  
when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” 
Some theoreticians have ridiculed dissenting views and attempted to limit 
their distribution by political means.12 
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Foundations with strong parameterized types 
 
“Everyone is free to elaborate [their] own foundations. All that is required of 
[a] Foundation of Mathematics is that its discussion embody absolute rigor, 
transparency, philosophical coherence, and addresses fundamental 
methodological issues.”13 
 
“The aims of logic should be the creation of “a unified conceptual apparatus 
which would supply a common basis for the whole of human knowledge.” 
[Tarski 1940] 
 
Note:  types in Direct Logic are much stronger than constructive types with 
constructive logic because Classical Direct Logic has all of the power of 
Classical Mathematics. 
 
Booleans are Propositions although Propositions are not reducible to Booleans: 
 True:Boolean 
 False:Boolean 
 Boolean⊑Proposition1         //each Boolean is a Proposition 
 Boolean≠Proposition1  //some Propositions are not Booleans 
 (3=3) ≠ True                         //the proposition 3=3 is not equal to True 
 (3=3) ≠ (4=4) 
                      //the proposition 3=3 is not equal to the proposition 4=4  
 (3=4) ≠ False   //the proposition 3=4 is not equal to False 
 
In Direct Logic, unrestricted recursion is allowed in programs. For example, 
There are uncountably many Actors.14 For example, Real∎[ ] can output any real 
numberi between 0 and 1 where 
        Real∎[ ]:ℝ ≡ [(0 either 1), ⩛Postpone Real∎[ ]] 
           where 
o (0 either 1) is the nondeterministic choice of 0 or 1,  
o [ first, ⩛rest] is the list that begins with first and whose 
remainder is rest, and 
o Postpone expression delays execution of expression until 
the value is needed. 
  
                                                          
i using binary representation.  
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Also, there are uncountably many propositions (because there is a different 
proposition for every real number). For example, 
                      p[x:ℝ]:Proposition1ℝ ≡ λ[y:ℝ] (y=x)  
defines a different predicate p[x] for each real number x, which holds for 
only one real number, namely x.i 
 
Strings can be abstracted into sentences and sentences can be abstracted into 
propositions that can be asserted.  
 
For example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i For example (p[3])[y] holds if and only if y=3. 
Propositions 
    e.g.  ∀[n:ℕ] ∃[m:ℕ] m>n 
       i.e., proposition that for every ℕ there is a larger 
ℕ  
 
intuitively : For every number, there is a larger number. 
Sentences 
  e.g. ⦅∀[n:ℕ] ⦅∃[m:ℕ] ⦅m>n⦆⦆⦆ 
    i.e., sentence for proposition that 
       for every ℕ there is a larger ℕ 
 
⦅∀[n:ℕ] ⦅∃[m:ℕ] ⦅m>n⦆⦆⦆  = ∀[n:ℕ] ∃[m:ℕ] m>n 
 
Strings 
  e.g. “⦅∀[n:ℕ] ⦅∃[m:ℕ] ⦅m>n⦆⦆⦆” 
      i.e., string for sentence for proposition that 
          for every ℕ there is a larger ℕ  
  e.g. “∀[n:ℕ] ∃[m:ℕ] m>n” 
      i.e., string for proposition that 
          for every ℕ there is a larger ℕ 
 
“⦅∀[n:ℕ] ⦅∃[m:ℕ] ⦅m>n⦆⦆⦆” = ⦅∀[n:ℕ] ⦅∃[m:ℕ] ⦅m>n⦆⦆⦆  
“∀[n:ℕ] ∃[m:ℕ] m>n” = ∀[n:ℕ] ∃[m:ℕ] m>n  
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Classical Direct Logic is a foundation of mathematics for Computer Science, 
which has a foundational theory (for convenience called “Mathematics”) that can 
be used in any other theory. A bare turnstile is used for Mathematics so that ⊢Ψ 
means that Ψ is a mathematical proposition that is a theorem of Mathematics and 
Φ⊢Ψ means that Ψ can be inferred from Φ. 
 
Direct Logic develops foundations for Mathematics by deriving sets from types 
and categorical axioms for the natural numbers and ordinals. 
 
Mathematics here means the common foundation of all classical mathematical 
theories from Euclid to the mathematics used to prove Fermat's Last [McLarty 
2010].   
 
Proof by Contradiction in Mathematics 
Proof by Contradiction is one of the most fundamental principles of Classical 
Mathematics (going back to before Euclid), which can be formalized 
 axiomatically to say that if  implies  and  then: 
                (⇨) ⇨  
 proof theoretically to say that proving ⇨ means that  is a 
theorem: 
               (⇨) ⇨ ⊢ 
 in [Jaśkowski 1934] natural deduction to say that  
( infers  and ) holds in a subproof 15 of a proof infers that  holds 
in the proof: 
               (⊢)⊢ 
Mathematics self proves its own formal consistency (contra [Gödel 1931]) 
The following are fundamental to Mathematics16: 
 Derivation by Contradiction, i.e. ├ (¬Φ⇒(Θ¬Θ)) ⇒ Φ, which says that 
a proposition can be proved showing that its negation implies a 
contradiction. 
 A theorem can be used in a proof17, i.e. ├ ((├ Φ)⇒Φ) 
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Theorem:  Mathematics self proves its own formal consistency18, i.e., 
├Consistent 
Formal Derivation. Suppose to obtain a contradiction, that mathematics is 
formally inconsistent, i.e.,  ¬Consistent. By definition of formal consistency, 
there is some proposition Ψ0 such that├ (Ψ0 ¬Ψ0) which by the Theorem 
Use means Ψ0¬Ψ0 , which is a contradiction. Thus, ├ Consistent by 
Derivation by Contradiction. 
Please note the following points:   
 The above argument formally mathematically proves that Mathematics is 
formally consistent and that it is not a premise of the theorem that 
Mathematics is formally consistent.  
 Mathematics was designed for consistent theories and consequently 
Mathematics can be used to prove its own formal consistency regardless 
of other axioms.19 
 
The above derivation means that “Mathematics is formally consistent” is a 
theorem in Classical Direct Logic.  
The above self-proof of formal consistency shows that the current common 
understanding that [Gödel 1931] proved “Mathematics cannot prove its own 
formal consistency, if it is formally consistent” is inaccurate.20  
  
1) Consistent  // hypothesis to derive a contradiction just in this subargument
├ Consistent                          // axiom of Proof by Contradiction using 1) and 3) 
2) ├(Ψ0Ψ0)                        // definition of inconsistency using 1)
  
3)  Ψ0Ψ0                                             // axiom of Soundness using 2)
  
    Natural Deduction
i  Proof of Formal Consistency of Mathematics 
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Mathematics Self Proves that it is Open.  
 
Mathematics proves that it is open in the sense that it can prove that its theorems 
cannot be computationally enumerated by a provably total procedure: 
   Theorem ⊢Mathematics is Open, i.e., 
                       ⊢TheoremsEnumerableByProvedTotalProcedure 
Proof.i  
Suppose to obtain a contradiction that  
             TheoremsEnumerableByProvedTotalProcedure 
Then by the definition of 
TheoremsEnumerableByProvedTotalProcedure there is a deterministic 
total procedure TheoremsEnumerator:[ℕ]→Proposition such that the 
following hold where Total:Proposition[ℕ]→ℕ:21 
 ⊢Total[TheoremsEnumerator] 
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢TheoremsEnumerator∎[i] 
             ∀[p:Proposition] (⊢p) ⇒ ∃[i:ℕ] TheoremsEnumerator∎[i]=p 
A subset of the theorems enumerated by TheoremsEnumerator are those 
stating that certain deterministic procedures [ℕ]→ℕ are total. 
Consequently, there is a deterministic total procedure 
ProvedTotalsEnumerator:([ℕ]→([ℕ]→ℕ))22, which enumerates proved 
total deterministic procedures: 
 ⊢Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator]  
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i] ] 
 ∀[f:([ℕ]→ℕ)] (⊢Total[f]) ⇒ ∃[i:ℕ] ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i]=f  
ProvedTotalsEnumerator can be used to implement the deterministic total 
procedure Diagonal:([ℕ]→ℕ) as follows: 
      Diagonal∎[i:ℕ]:ℕ ≡ 1+ (ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i])∎[i] 
Consequently: 
 ⊢Total[Diagonal] because it is the deterministic composition of 
proved total deterministic procedures. 
 ⊢Total[Diagonal] because Diagonal differs from every procedure 
enumerated by ProvedTotalsEnumerator. 
The above contradiction completes the proof. 
 
                                                          
i This argument appeared in [Church 1934] expressing concern that the argument meant 
that there is “no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing as logic.”  
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[Franzén 2004] argued that Mathematics is inexhaustible because of inferential 
undecidabilityi of mathematical theories. The above theorem that Mathematics is 
open provides another independent argument for the inexhaustibility of 
Mathematics. 
 
Higher Order Logic 
“If the mathematical community at some stage in the development of 
mathematics has succeeded in becoming (informally) clear about a 
particular mathematical structure, this clarity can be made 
mathematically exact ... Why must there be such a characterization? 
Answer: if the clarity is genuine, there must be a way to articulate it 
precisely. If there is no such way, the seeming clarity must be illusory ... 
for every particular structure developed in the practice of mathematics, 
there is [a] categorical characterization of it.”23 
 
Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than 1st order axiomatizations  of set 
theory in that it provides categoricity for natural numbers ℕ, reals ℝ, ordinals O. 
set theory, the lambda calculus and Actors. Categoricity is very important in 
Computer Science so that there are no nonstandard elements in models of 
computational systems, e.g., infinite integers and infinitesimal reals. For example, 
nonstandard models cause problems in model checking if a model has specified 
properties. 
 
Natural Number Induction 
The mathematical theory24 Nat categorically axiomatises the Natural Numbers 
using the following induction axiom:25 
        ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]⇨P[+1[i]]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
 
  
                                                          
i See section immediately below. 
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The other axioms of Nat  are as follows: 
• 0:ℕ 
• ∀[i:ℕ]  +1[i]:ℕ 
• ∄[i:ℕ]  +1[i]=0 
• ∀[i,j:ℕ]  +1[i]=+1[j] ⇨ i=j 
 
Proof by Contradiction in Nat  
Proof by Contradiction is one of the most fundamental principles of Classical 
Mathematics (going back to before Euclid), which can be formalized 
 axiomatically to say that if  implies  and  then: 
                (⇨) ⇨  
 proof theoretically to say that proving ⇨ means that  is a 
theorem: 
               (⇨) ⇨ ⊢
Nat
  
 in [Jaśkowski 1934] natural deduction to say that  
( infers  and ) holds in a subproof 26 of a proof infers that  holds 
in the proof: 
               (⊢)⊢
Nat
  
 
Theorem Nat  proves that it is formally consistent:i ⊢
Nat
 Consistent[Nat]   
Proof:  Suppose to derive an inconsistency that Consistent[Nat] . By the 
definition of formal inconsistency for Nat, there is some proposition 
Ψ0:Proposition1 such that ⊢Nat (Ψ0Ψ0) which can be used to 
infer in Nat
  
that Ψ0Ψ0. The above contradiction completes the proof. 
 
Theorem (Indiscernibility for Nat ):27 
    ∀[i,j:ℕ]  i=j ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[i]⇔P[j] 
Theorem (Model Soundness of Nat ): (⊢
Nat 
) ⇨ (⊨ℕ ) 
Proof: Suppose ⊢
Nat
 . The theorem immediately follows because the axioms 
for the theory Nat 
 
hold in the type ℕ. 
                                                          
i Note that the results in [Gödel 1931] do not apply because propositions in 
Mathematics are strongly typed and consequently the fixed point used construct 
Gödel’s proposition I’mUnprovable does not exist in Mathematics. See the critique of 
Gödel’s results in this article. 
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Theorem (Categoricity of Nat ):28  
If X be a type satisfying the axioms for the natural numbers Nat, then there is  a 
unique isomorphism I with ℕ defined as follows:   
• I:Xℕ 
• I[0ℕ] ≡ 0X 
• I[+1[j]] ≡ +1
𝐗[I[j]] 
  because 
• I is defined on ℕ  
• I is 1-1 
• I is onto X 
• I is a homomorphism 
 I[0ℕ] ≡ 0X 
 ∀[i:ℕ] I[+1[j]] ≡ +1
𝐗[I[j]] 
• I-1 is a homomorphism 
 I-1[0X] ≡ 0ℕ 
 ∀[z:X] I-1[+1
𝐗[z]] ≡ [+1[I-1[z]] 
• If g is an isomorphism with X, then 
g=I 
 
Corollary There are no infinite numbers in models of the theory Nat , i.e., 
      ∀[X::] NatX ⇨ ∄[i:X] ∀[j:X] j<i 
 
Definition:  ClosedTermsNat    is all terms of Nat  with no free variables.  
 
Corollary:  NatClosedTermsNat    
Proof. ClosedTermsNat  clearly satisfies the axioms of Nat.29  
Categoricity provides the answer as to which closed terms are equal.  
 
Theorem:30 Logical completeness of Nat  
   ∀[:Proposition1]  (⊨ℕ ) ⇒ ⊢Nat  
Proof. 
Suppose in Nat   , :Proposition1 and  ⊨ℕ . Further suppose to 
obtain a contradiction that .  Hence  and , which is a 
contradiction. Therefore ⊢
Nat 
 using proof by contradiction in 
Nat.
31 
 
Richard Dedekind 
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Although proposition has finite length, there are uncountably many propositions. 
Consequently, even though every proof has finite length, there are uncountably 
many proofs because there are uncountably many propositions.  Thus a proof may 
not be expressible as a character string because there are uncountable many 
proofs. Although by the above theorem Nat    is inferentially complete, some 
proofs are not expressible as character strings. It is an open problem to 
characterize theorems of Nat  whose proofs cannot be expressed as character 
strings. 
 
Corollary.  Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Nat , i.e., 
          ∀[:PropositionNat ]  (⊨ℕ ) ⇔ (⊢Nat )  
 
Theorem. Inferential Decidability of Nat , i.e.,   
                ∀[:PropositionNat ]  (⊢
Nat
 )  (⊢
Nat
 ) 
Proof.  Follows immediately from (⊨ℕ ) ⇔ (⊢Nat ) 
 
Theorem (Instance Adequacy of Nat ):32 
       ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  (∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 P[i])  ⇨ ⊢
Nat
 ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]   
Proof: Suppose ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 P[i] which means by completeness ∀[i:ℕ] ⊨ℕ P[i]. 
Therefore ∀[i:ℕ] ⊨ℕ P[i] which means by completeness ⊢Nat ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]       
 
Definition Total[f:([ℕ]→ℕ)]:PropositionNat  ≡ ∀[i:ℕ] ∃[j:ℕ] f∎[i]=j  
 
Corollary (Instance Adequacy of Nat ):33 
       ⊢
Nat
 ∀[i:ℕ] Total[NatProvablyTotal∎[i]]  
Proof: ⊢
Nat
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 Total[NatProvablyTotal∎[i]] The proof follows 
immediately from Instance Adequacy of Nat. 
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Lemma. NatProvablyComputableR is not computationally 
enumerable.34 
 
Theorem Nat proves that its proofs cannot be expressed as character strings that 
are validity computationally decidable. 
Proof: Suppose to obtain a contradiction that proofs can be expressed as character 
string that are validity computationally decidable. Since 
ProvablyComputableR is not computationally enumerable, proofs in 
Nat  for ProvablyComputableR cannot be represented as character 
strings that are validity computationally decidable. 
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Theorem Nat proves that its theorems are not enumerable by a provably total 
procedure, i.e. 
                   ⊢
Nat
 TheoremsEnumerableByProvedTotalProcedure[Nat ] 
Proof:35   
Suppose to obtain a contradiction that  
              TheoremsEnumerableByProvedTotalProcedure[Nat ] 
Then there is a deterministic procedure 
TheoremsEnumerator:[ℕ]→PropositionNat  such that the 
following hold: 
  ⊢
Nat
 Total[TheoremsEnumerator] 
 ∀[p:TheoremNat ] ∃[i:ℕ] TheoremsEnumerator∎[i]=p 
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 TheoremsEnumerator∎[i] 
A subset of the theorems enumerated by TheoremsEnumerator are those 
stating that certain deterministic procedures [ℕ]→ℕ are total. 
Consequently, there is a deterministic total procedure 
ProvedTotalsEnumerator:([ℕ]→([ℕ]→ℕ))36 such that the following 
hold: 
 ⊢Nat Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator] 
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢Nat Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i] ] 
 ∀[f:([ℕ]→ℕ)] (⊢Nat Total[f])⇒∃[i:ℕ] ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i]=f 
because 
∀[f:([ℕ]→ℕ)] (⊢Total[f])⇒∃[i:ℕ] TheoremsEnumerator∎[i]=Total[f ] 
 
ProvedTotalsEnumerator can be used to implement the deterministic total 
procedure Diagonal:([ℕ]→ℕ) as follows: 
      Diagonal∎[i:ℕ]:ℕ ≡ 1+ (ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i])∎[i] 
 
Consequently: 
 ⊢Nat Total[Diagonal] because Diagonal is the deterministic 
composition of proved total procedures. 
 ⊢
Nat
 Total[Diagonal] because Diagonal differs from every 
procedure enumerated by ProvedTotalsEnumerator. 
The above contradiction completes the proof. 
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Corollary.  There are theorems37 in Nat  that procedures are total whose proofs 
cannot be expressed as a character string.38 
Proof.  If all of the proofs of could be expressed using character strings, then 
Then there is a provably total deterministic procedure 
TheoremsEnumerator:[ℕ]→PropositionNat  such that 
 ⊢
Nat
 Total[TheoremsEnumerator] 
because the procedure for enumerating character string proofs is total 
 ∀[p:TheoremNat ] ∃[i:ℕ] TheoremsEnumerator∎[i]=p 
because every character string of a proof is enumerated 
 ∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 TheoremsEnumerator∎[i] 
because only character strings of proofs are enumerated 
 
Theorem:  Proof verification in Nat  is computationally undecidable 
Proof:  Proofs of totality in Nat  of procedures are countable because [ℕ]→ℕ is 
countable.  But proofs of totality in Nat  are not computationally 
enumerable. 
 
Weakest Preconditions 
     WeakestPrecondition[:PropositionanOrderℕ, 
                                                f:([ℕ]→ℕ)]:PropositionanOrder+1ℕ ≡ 
                                                                                                                    λ[i:ℕ] [f∎[i]]  
 
Theorem Weakest Preconditions are monotonic in both arguments, i.e.,i 
 ∀[1,2:PropositionanOrderℕ; f:([ℕ]→ℕ)] 
    (1⇴2)  
          ⇨ (WeakestPrecondition[1, f]⇴WeakestPrecondition[2, f]) 
 ∀[:PropositionanOrderℕ; f1,f2:([ℕ]→ℕ)] 
              f1⊒f2 ⇨ (WeakestPrecondition[, f1]⇴WeakestPrecondition[, f2]) 
 
                                                          
i 1⇴2 means ∀[i:ℕ] 1[i]⇨2[i] 
   Weakest precondition because: 
       ∀[:PropositionanOrderℕ]  
           (⇴λ[i:ℕ] [f∎[i]]) ⇨ (⇴WeakestPrecondition[, f]) 
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Summary of Nat   
Nat  can be summarized as follows: 
 Nat  is inferentially decidable 
    ∀[:PropositionNat ] (⊦
Nat 
 )  (⊦
Nat 
 )  
  A proposition is true ⇔ provable in Nat   
    ∀[:PropositionNat ] (⊨ℕ) ⇔ (⊦Nat  ) 
  Indiscernibility for Nat : 
    ∀[i,j:ℕ]  i=j ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[i]⇔P[j] 
 Instance Adequacy of Nat : 
    ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  (∀[i:ℕ] ⊢
Nat
 P[i])  ⇨ ⊢
Nat
 ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
  Nat  is categorical for ℕ 
    ⊦
Nat 
 ∀[X::] NatX ⇔ Isomorphic[X,ℕ] 
   Nat  proves its own consistency 
    ⊦
Nat 
 (∃[:PropositionNat ] ⊦
Nat 
 ) 
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Actors 
For each Actor x, x[t] is the behavior of x at time t of type Timex, where 
Behavior39, where Com is the type for a communication and an outcome for a 
communication received has a finite set of created Actors, a finite set of sent 
communications, and a behavior for the next communication received. The 
mathematical theory Act categorically axiomatises Actors using the following 
axioms where ↷ is transitive and irreflexive: 
• Primitive Actors 
o ∀[i:ℕ]  i:Actor                                           // natural numbers are Actors 
o  ∀[x1,x2:Actor] [x1, x2]:Actor               // a tuple of Actors is an Actor 
• An Actor’s event ordering 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1,c2:Com]  c1≠c2 ⇒ Receivedx[c1]↷Receivedx[c2]  
                                                                    Receivedx[c2]↷Receivedx[c1] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1:Com]  
                       ∄[c2:Com] Receivedx[c1]↷Receivedx[c2]↷Afterx[c1] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c:Com] Initialx↷Receivedx[c]↷Afterx[c] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1,c2:Com]  
        Finite[{c:Com | Receivedx[c1]↷Receivedx[c]↷Receivedx[c2]}] 
• An Actor’s behavior change 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1:Com]  (∄[c2:Com] Receivedx[c2]↷Receivedx[c1]) 
                                                                            ⇒ x[Receivedx[c1]]=x[Initialx] 
o ∀[x:Actor, c1,c2:Com]  
            (∄[c3:Com] Afterx[c1]↷Receivedx[c3]↷Receivedx[c2]) 
                                                                         ⇒ x[Receivedx[c2]]=x[Afterx[c1]] 
• Between Actors event ordering 
o ∀[c:Com] Sent[c]↷Received[c] 
o ∀[c1,c2:Com]  
    Finite[{c:Com | 
                         ∃[x1,x2:Actor] Sent[c1]↷Receivedx1[c]↷Receivedx2[c2]}] 
Theorem:  Actor Induction 
    ∀[x:Actor, P:Proposition1Behavior] 
         (P[x[Initialx]]  ∀[c:Com] P[x[Receivedx[c]]]⇨P[x[Afterx[c]]]) 
               ⇨ ∀[c:Com] P[x[Receivedx[c]]]  P[x[Afterx[c]]] 
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Provably Responds 
By contrast with the nondeterministic lambda calculus and pure Logic Programs, 
there is an always-halting Actor Unbounded that when sent a start[ ] message can 
compute an integer of unbounded size. This is accomplished by creating a counter 
with the following variables: 
 count initially 0 
 continue initially True 
and concurrently sending it both a stop[ ] message and a go[ ] message such that: 
 When a go[ ] message is received: 
1. if continue is True, increment count by 1 and return the result of 
sending this counter a go[ ] message. 
2. if continue is False, return Void 
 When a stop[ ] message is received, return count and set continue to False 
for the next message received. 
 
By the Actor Model of Computation, the above Actor will eventually receive the 
stop[ ] message and return an unbounded number. 
 
An Actor that
Provably Responds
             
∎∎go[ ] 
continue=True
 also
 count := count + 1 
continue := False
Integer
continue=False
initially: continue=True, count=0
count 
go[ ]
stop[ ]
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The following hold: 
• ∀[t:ℕ]  ⊬
Act  
ResponseBefore[t]               // unbounded response time 
•  ⊦
Act
 ∃[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t]                               // provably responds 
 
Theorem. Unbounded Nondeterminacy of Actors 
The Actor Unbounded described above cannot be implemented as a  
nondeterministic lambda calculus expression and cannot be implemented as a pure 
Logic Program. 
 
Theorem. Computational Adequacy of Actors. 
If for each i:ℕ, Fi is a nondeterministic λ expression such that  
∀[i:ℕ] Fi⊑Fi+1,     then (limiti:ℕ Fi):Actor 
 
Theorem. Categoricity of Act  
If X be a type satisfying the axioms for Act   , then there is  a unique isomorphism 
with Actor. 
 
Theorem: Logical completeness of Act   
                  ∀[:PropositionAct   ]  (⊨Actor ) ⇒ (⊢Act ) 
 
Corollary.  Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Act , i.e.,  
                              ∀[:PropositionAct   ]  (⊨Actor ) ⇔ (⊢Act ) 
 
Theorem.  Inferential Decidability of Act , i.e.,  
                          ∀[:PropositionAct   ]  (⊢
Act
 )  (⊢
Act
 ) 
Proof.  Follows immediately from (⊨Actor ) ⇔ (⊢Act )  
 
Conclusion 
Strong Types enable new mathematical theorems to be proved including the 
Formal Consistency of Mathematics. Also, Strong Types enable proofs of the 
Categoricity of axiomatizations of the ordinals and the cumulative hierarchy of 
sets of a type. 
Furthermore, Strong Types are extremely important in Direct Logic because they 
block all know paradoxes[Cantini and Bruni 2017].  Blocking known paradoxes 
makes Direct Logic safer for use in Intelligent Applications by preventing security 
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holes. For example, Strong Types block the following paradoxes:  Berry [Russell 
1906], Burali-Forti [Burali-Forti 1897], Church [Church 1934], Curry [Curry 
1941], Girard [Coquand 1986], and Liar [Eubulides of Miletus], and Löb [Löb 
1955].  
Information Invariance is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of the 
following: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inference 
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be 
inferred. 
 
Computer Science needs a rigorous foundation for all of mathematics that enables 
computers to carry out all reasoning without human intervention.40 [Russell 1925] 
attempted basing foundations entirely on types, but foundered on the issue of 
being expressive enough to carry to some common mathematical reasoning. 
[Church 1932, 1933] attempted basing foundations entirely on untyped higher-
order functions, but foundered because it was shown to be inconsistent [Kleene 
and Rosser 1935]. Presently, Isabelle [Paulson 1989] and Coq [Coquand and Huet 
1986] are founded on types and do not allow theories to reason about themselves. 
Classical Direct Logic is a foundation for all of mathematical reasoning based on 
strong types (to provide grounding for concepts) that allows general inference 
about reasoning. 
 
[Gödel 1931] claimed inferential undecidabilityi results for mathematics using the 
proposition I'mUnprovable In opposition to Wittgenstein's correct argument his 
proposition leads to contradictions in mathematics, Gödel claimed that the results 
of [Gödel 1931] were for a cut-down relational 1st order theory of natural numbers. 
However, relational 1st order theories are not a suitable foundation for Computer 
Science because of the requirement that computer systems be able to carry out all 
reasoning without requiring human intervention (including reasoning about their 
own inference systems).  
 
Following [Russell 1925, and Church 1932-1933], Direct Logic was developed 
and then investigated propositions with results below. 
 
Formalization of Wittgenstein's proof that Gödel's proposition I'mUnprovable leads 
to contradiction in mathematics. So the consistency of mathematics had to be 
rescued against Gödel's proposition constructed using what [Carnap 1934] later 
                                                          
i sometimes called logical “incompleteness” 
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called the “Diagonal Lemma” which is equivalent to the Y untyped fixed point 
operator on propositions.  Use of the Y untyped fixed point operator on 
propositions in results of [Curry 1941] and [Löb 1955] also lead to inconsistency 
in mathematics. Consequently, mathematics had to be rescued against these uses 
of the Y untyped fixed point operator for propositions. 
 
Self-proof of the formal consistency of mathematics. Consequently, mathematics 
had to be rescued against the claim [Gödel 1931] that mathematics cannot prove 
its own formal consistency. Also, it became an open problem whether 
mathematics proves its own formal consistency, which was resolved by the author 
discovering an amazing simple proof.41 A solution is to require strongly typed 
mathematics to bar use of the Y untyped fixed point operator for propositions.42 
However, some theoreticians have very reluctant to accept the solution. 
According to [Dawson 2006]:43 
o Gödel’s results altered the mathematical landscape, but they did not 
“produce a debacle”. 
o There is less controversy today over mathematical foundations than there 
was before Gödel’s work. 
However, [Gödel 1931] has produced a controversy of a very different kind from 
the one discussed by Dawson: 
 The common understanding that mathematics cannot prove its own 
formal consistency44 has been disproved. 
 Consequently, [Gödel 1931] has now led to increased controversy 
over mathematical foundations. 
 
Requirement to use higher order logic because moderately strong theories of 1st 
order logic are inconsistent.  Categorical higher order theories of Natural 
Numbers, Reals, and Actors are inferentially complete and inferentially decidable.   
In general, theorems of theories in higher order logic are not computationally 
enumerable, proof correctness is computationally undecidable, and some proofs 
are inexpressible as character strings. Consequently, it will be forever necessary 
to invent new proof notations that were previously not expressed in a process 
called “Progressive Knowing”. 
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The development of Direct Logic has strengthened the position of working 
mathematicians as follows:i 
 Allowing freedom from the philosophical dogma of the 1st Order Thesis 
 Providing usable strong types for all of Mathematics that provides theories 
that have categorical models 
 Allowing theories to freely reason about theories 
 Providing Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic for safely reasoning about 
theories of practice that are (of necessity) pervasively inconsistent. 
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Appendix 1. Historical Background 
“The powerful (try to) insist that their statements are literal depictions of a single 
reality. ‘It really is that way’, they tell us. ‘There is no alternative.’ But those on 
the receiving end of such homilies learn to read them allegorically, these are 
techniques used by subordinates to read through the words of the powerful to the 
concealed realities that have produced them.” [Law 2004] 
 
Gödel was certain 
“ ‛Certainty’ is far from being a sign of success; it is only a symptom of lack of 
imagination and conceptual poverty. It produces smug satisfaction and prevents 
the growth of knowledge.” [Lakatos 1976] 
 
Paul Cohen [2006] wrote as follows of his interaction with Gödel:45  
“His [Gödel's] main interest seemed to lie in discussing 
the ‛truth’ or ‛falsity’ of these [mathematical] questions, 
not merely in their undecidability. He struck me as 
having an almost unshakable belief in this “realist” 
position, which I found difficult to share. His ideas were 
grounded in a deep philosophical belief as to what the 
human mind could achieve. I greatly admired this faith 
in the power and beauty of Western Culture, as he put it, 
and would have liked to understand more deeply what 
were the sources of his strongly held beliefs. Through 
our discussions, I came closer to his point of view, 
although I never shared completely his ‛realist’ point of 
view, that all questions of Set Theory were in the final analysis, 
either true or false.”  
 
According to John von Neumann, Gödel was “the 
greatest logician since Aristotle.”46 However, [von 
Neumann 1961] expressed a very different mathematical 
philosophy than Gödel: 
  
“It is not necessarily true that the mathematical 
method is something absolute, which was revealed 
from on high, or which somehow, after we got hold 
of it, was evidently right and has stayed evidently 
right ever since.” 
 
Kurt Gödel 
 
John von Neumann 
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[Gödel 1931] based incompleteness results on the thesis that mathematics 
necessarily has the proposition I'mUnprovable in Principia Mathematica [Russell 
1902].  
 
Wittgenstein’s Paradox 
Wittgenstein correctly noted that Gödel's I'mUnprovable infers inconsistency in 
mathematics:47  
“Let us suppose [Gödel's writings are correct and therefore] I prove48 
the improvability (in Russell’s system) of [Gödel's I'mUnprovable] P; [i.e., 
⊢⊬P where P⇔⊬P] then by this proof I have proved P [i.e., ⊢P]. Now if 
this proof were one in Russell’s system [i.e., ⊢⊢P] — I should in this case 
have proved at once that it belonged [i.e., ⊢P] and did not belong [i.e., ⊢P 
because P⇔⊢P] to Russell’s system. 
    But there is a contradiction here! [i.e., ⊢P and ⊢P] 
[This] is what comes of making up such sentences.” [emphasis added] 
 
According to [Monk 2007]: 
“Wittgenstein hoped that his work on 
mathematics would have a cultural 
impact, that it would threaten the attitudes 
that prevail in logic, mathematics and the 
philosophies of them. On this measure it 
has been a spectacular failure.”  
Unfortunately, recognition of the worth of 
Wittgenstein’s work on mathematics came 
long after his death. For decades, many 
theoreticians mistakenly believed that they had 
been completely victorious over Wittgenstein. 
 
Gödel's maintained: 
“Wittgenstein did not understand it [Gödel's 
1931 article on Principia Mathematica] (or 
pretended not to understand it). He 
interpreted it as a kind of logical paradox, 
while in fact it is just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within an 
absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics (finitary number theory or 
combinatorics).”49 
In the above, Gödel retreated from the [Gödel 1931] results on Principia 
Mathematic to claiming that the results were for the relational 1st order theory 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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Relational1stOrderNatualNumbers  in order to defend his 
I'mUnprovableInRelational1stOrderNatualNumbers. However, the [Gödel 1931] 
incompleteness result is not very impressive because 
Relational1stOrderNatualNumbers  is a very weak theory which cannot 
even prove that the Ackermann procedure is total. 
 
Trying to retain I’mUnprovable forced Gödel into a very narrow and constricted 
place of reducing propositions to strings for sentences and then to Gödel numbers 
axiomatized in a 1st order theory to avoid Wittgenstein's devastating criticism. 
This narrow constricted place is intolerable for computer science, which needs to 
reason about propositions in a more natural and flexible way using Strong Types. 
 
Let T be a theory capable of representing all computable functions on Strings and 
Natural Numbers with GödelNumber[aWellFormedString] being the Gödel 
number of aWellFormedString, where a well-formed string is here considered to 
be a proposition. A Diagonal Lemma is: 
      If F is a well-formed string in the language with one free variable, then  
            there is a well-formed string S such that the following is provable in T: 
                    S  ⇔ F[GödelNumber[S]]  
 
Letting GödelNumberToWellFormedString[n] be the well-formed string with 
Gödel number n, define Eubulides as follows (where  
“GödelNumberToWellFormedString[n]” is the string formed by prefixing the 
character  to the well-formed string with Gödel number n): 
           Eubulides[n] ≡ “GödelNumberToWellFormedString[n]”  
 
By the above Diagonal Lemma, there is a well-formed string I’mFalse such that 
the following is provable in T (where 
“GödelNumberToWellFormedString[GödelNumber[I’mFalse]]” is the result 
of prefixing the well-formed string 
GödelNumberToWellFormedString[GödelNumber[I’mFalse]] with ):50 
     I’mFalse ⇔ Eubulides[GödelNumber[I’mFalse]]  
                     ⇔ “GödelNumberToWellFormedString[GödelNumber[I’mFalse]]” 
                     ⇔ I’mFalse  
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[Chaitin 2007] complained about basing something as important as 
incompleteness something so trivial as I'mUnprovable:  
“[Gödel’s proof] was too superficial. It didn't get at the real heart of what was 
going on. It was more tantalizing than anything else. It was not a good reason 
for something so devastating and fundamental. It was too clever by half. It was 
too superficial. [It was based on the clever construction] I'mUnprovable So 
what? This doesn't give any insight how serious the problem is.” 
 
[Gödel 1931] results can be formalized as follows: 
     NotProvablen[Ψ:Propositionn]:Propositionn+1] ≡ ⊢Ψ 
The construction of I'mUnprovable is blocked because the procedure NotProvable 
does not have a fixed point (by Gödel’s Diagonal Lemma) I'mUnprovable such 
that I'mUnprovable⇔⊢I'mUnprovable because the procedure NotProvable 
maps a proposition Ψ of degree n into a proposition ⊢Ψ of degree n+1. 
 
However, Gödel, Church, Turing, and many other logicians continued up to the 
present time to believe in the importance of Gödel’s proof based on the 
proposition I'mUnprovable.51   
 
Although Gödel’s incompleteness results for I'mUnprovable have fundamental 
problems, the work was extremely significant in further the development of the 
history of metamathematics. For example, the following paradoxes were 
developed following along Gödel’s work: 
Curry’s Paradox [Curry 1941] Suppose Ψ:PropositionanOrder. 
Curryn[p:Propositionn]:PropositionMax[n+1,anOrder+1] ≡ p⇒Ψ 
Curry’s Paradox is blocked because the procedure Curry does not have a 
fixed point. 
Löb’s Paradox [Löb 1955]  Suppose Ψ:PropositionanOrder. 
  Löbn[p:Propositionn]:PropositionMax[n+1,anOrder+1] ≡ (├p)⇒Ψ 
Löb’s Paradox is blocked because the procedure Löb does not have a fixed 
point.  
 
A key difference is that Direct Logic works directly with propositions as opposed 
to the work of Gödel, Curry, and Löb, which was based on relational 1st order 
theories with propositions from sentence strings coded as integers. 
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Nat
1
   
Nat
1 
is a 1st order axiomatization of the Natural Numbers with the following 
computationally enumerable axioms: 
• ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1 0:ℕ 
• ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1 ∀[i:ℕ]  +1[i]:ℕ 
• ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1 ∄[i:ℕ]  +1[i]=0 
• ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1 ∀[i,j:ℕ]  +1[i]=+1[j] ⇨ i=j 
• ∀[P:StringProposition1ℕ] ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1 Induction[P] 
     where 
                Induction[P:StringProposition1ℕ] ≡ 
                            (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]⇨ P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
 
Nat  proves Nat
1
, i.e.,   ⊦
Nat  Nat1 
Theorem ⊬𝑁𝑎𝑡1∀[i:ℕ]Total[Nat1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]Enumerator∎[i]] 
Proof:  Suppose to obtain a contradiction that 
           ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1∀[i:ℕ]Total[Nat1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]Enumerator∎[i]] 
             Diagonal
∎
[i:ℕ] ≡ 1-(Nat1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
Enumerator
∎
[i])
∎
[i] 
        ∴ Diagonal:Nat
1
ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
 which is a contradiction 
 
Theorem ⊨ℕ ∀[i:ℕ]Total[Nat1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
Enumerator
∎
[i]] 
  Proof: By construction of Nat1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
Enumerator 
 
As a consequence of the above two theorems, 
                   ∀[i:ℕ]Total[Nat1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
Enumerator
∎
 [i]] 
is true but unprovable in Nat
1
. 
 
Also, can fail to prove responsiveness of Actor systems as illustrated by the 
following theorem for the Actor Unbounded discussed elsewhere in this article. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Theorem ⊬𝑁𝑎𝑡1∃[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t] 
Proof: Suppose to obtain a contradiction ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1∃[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t], 
i.e., ⊦𝑁𝑎𝑡1∀[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t] ∴ 
Consistent[{ResponseBefore[t] | t:ℕ}] which by compactness for Nat
1
 
∃[S⊆{ResponseBefore[t] | t:ℕ}:FiniteBooleanℕ] Consistent[S] 
∴ ∃[t:ℕ] Consistent[{ResponseBefore[j] | j<t}] meaning 
 ∀[t:ℕ] Consistent[{ResponseBefore[j] | j<t}] which is 
 a contradiction 
 
Theorem  ⊨ ∃[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t] 
 
As a consequence of the above two theorems, ∃[t:ℕ] ResponseBefore[t] 
is true but unprovable in Nat
1
. 
 
P
o
w
e
r
  
 
Strong
Weak
Narrow Wide
Inconsistent
1
st
 Order Theories
 
 
After [Church 1934], logicians faced the following dilemma: 
 1st order theories cannot be powerful enough to be a foundation for Computer 
Science lest they fall into inconsistency because of Church’s Paradox. 
 2nd order theories contravene the philosophical doctrine that theorems must 
be computationally enumerable. 
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Since Nat  is more powerful than Nat
1
, it must be able to formalize the argument 
in Church’s Paradox. The following section shows why the argument in Church’s 
Paradox fails against Nat. 
 
Church’s Paradox fails for Higher Order Logic 
Mathematics can formalize axioms Instance1which are strong enough to prove 
Church’s Paradox using Instance1 
 
provably computable reals, which  can be 
defined as follows: 
  Instance1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
 
≡ R
[0,1]
∋λ[r] Instance1⊦ Computable[r] 
where Instance1 has axioms given just below: 
 (0:ℕ):Instance1 
 (∀[i:ℕ]  +1[i]:ℕ):Instance1 
 (∄[i:ℕ]  +1[i]=0):Instance1 
 (∀[i,j:ℕ]  +1[i]=+1[j] ⇨ i=j):Instance1 
 ∀[P:StringProposition1ℕ] Induction[P]:Instance1 
        where 
       Induction[P:StringProposition1ℕ] ≡ 
           (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]⇨ P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
 ∀[P:StringProposition1ℕ] Extension[P]:Instance1 
         Extension[P:StringProposition1ℕ ≡ 
               ∀[i:ℕ]  i∈Extension[P ] ⇔ P[i] 
 Instance1ProvablyComputableR
[0,1]
Enumerator 
                                    :([ℕ] → Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1)  
 (∀[r:Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]]  
         ∃[i:ℕ] r=Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]Enumerator∎[i]):Instance1 
 (∀[i:ℕ] 
              Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]Enumerator∎[i] 
                                 :Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1]):Instance1 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
Instance1 is inconsistent  
Define Diagonal:[ℕ]→ Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1] 
    Diagonal∎[i:ℕ] ≡ 1-(Instance1ComputableEnumerator∎[i]) ∎[i] 
 Diagonal is not in the range of Instance1ComputableEnumerator, which is a 
contradiction because  
         Instance1 ⊦ Diagonal:Instance1ProvablyComputableR[0,1] 
 
[Church 1934] pointed out that there is no 
obvious way to remove the  inconsistency 
meaning that if Instance1 is taken to be an exact 
description of logic52 then, 
“Indeed, if there is no formalization of logic as 
a whole, then there is no exact description of 
what logic is, for it in the very nature of an 
exact description that it implies a 
formalization. And if there no exact 
description of logic, then there is no sound 
basis for supposing that there is such a thing 
as logic.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Instance1 does not stand as legitimate Mathematics because the axioms are 
“self-referential.”  Therefore, it makes sense to use Inconsistency Robust logic 
for Instance1 instead of classical logic. 
 
  
Alonzo Church 
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Discussion  
Church’s Paradox and other paradoxes raise a number of issues that can be 
addressed by requiring mathematics to be strongly typed and using higher order 
logic as follows: 
 
1. Requiring Mathematics to be strongly typed using so that 
 Mathematics self proves that it is “open” in the sense that theorems are 
not computationally enumerable.53 
 Mathematics self proves that it is formally consistent.54 
 Strong mathematical theories for Natural Numbers, Ordinals, Set 
Theory, the Lambda Calculus, Actors, etc. are inferentially decidable, 
meaning that every true proposition is provable and every proposition 
is either provable or disprovable.  Furthermore, theorems of these 
theories are not enumerable by a provably total procedure. 
2. It was initially thought that mathematics could be based just on character 
strings. Then diagonalization was discovered and things haven’t been the 
same since. The string for the general 1st order Nat
1
 non-categorical 
induction schema is as follows for each P:StringProposition1ℕ: 
                         ( P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]  P[i]⇨P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]  
which has countably many 1st order propositions as instances that are 
abstracted from the countably many character strings of type 
StringProposition1ℕ and which differs fundamentally from the 
character string for the more general 2nd order categorical induction axiom, 
which is as follows:55 
    "∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  (P[0]]  ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]⇨P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]" 
Although the theory Nat  has only finitely many axioms, 
the above string abstracted as a proposition has 
uncountably many 1st order propositions as instances.i 
In this way, Nat  differs fundamentally from the 1st order 
theory Nat
1
 because, being uncountable, not all 
instances of the Nat  induction axiom can be obtained 
by abstraction from character strings. Proofs abstracted 
from character strings for the axioms of Nat
1 
can be 
computationally enumerated and are valid proofs in 
Nat, but this does not enumerate all of the proofs of 
                                                          
i with the consequence that the argument in Church’s Paradox is blocked in the theory 
Nat 
 
because theorems are not enumerable by a provably total procedure 
Ernst Zermelo 
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Nat! What is to be made of the uncountable number of theorems of Nat  whose 
proofs cannot be written down in text? 
 
Additional limitations of Relational 1st order theories 
“By this it appears how necessary it is for nay man that aspires to true 
knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to 
correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them himself.  
For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the 
reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, 
but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lies 
the foundation of their errors...” 
[Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 4]56 
 
A relational 1st order theory is very weak. For example, a relational 1st order theory 
is incapable of characterizing even the natural numbers, i.e., there are infinite 
integers in models of every relational 1st order axiomatization of the natural 
numbers. Furthermore, there are infinitesimal real numbers  in models of every 
relational 1st order axiomatization of the real numbers.i Of course, infinite integers 
and infinitesimal reals are monsters that must be banned from the mathematical 
foundations of Computer Science. 
 
However, some theoreticians have found relational 1st order theory to be useful 
for their careers because it is weak enough that they can prove theorems about 
relational 1st order axiomatizations whereas they cannot prove such theorems 
about stronger practical systems, e.g., Classical Direct Logic.57  
 
Zermelo considered the 1st Order Thesis to be a mathematical “hoax” because it 
necessarily allowed unintended models of axioms.58  
 
[Barwise 1985] critiqued the 1st Order Thesis that mathematical foundations 
should be restricted to 1st order theories as follows: 
 
                                                          
i Likewise, relational 1st order set theory (e.g. ZFC) is very weak. See discussion in this 
article. 
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The reasons for the widespread, often uncritical 
acceptance of the first-order thesis are numerous. The 
first-order thesis ... confuses the subject matter of logic 
with one of its tools. First-order language is just an 
artificial language structured to help investigate logic, 
much as a telescope is a tool constructed to help study 
heavenly bodies. From the perspective of the 
mathematics in the street, the first-order thesis is like 
the claim that astronomy is the study of the telescope.59 
 
Computer Science is making increasing use of Model 
Analysis60 in the sense of analyzing relationships among the following: 
 concurrent programs and their Actor Model denotations 
 domain axiom systems and computations on these domains 
 
In Computer Science, it is important that the natural numbers be axiomatized in a 
way that does not allow non-numbers (e.g. infinite ones) in models of the axioms.  
Theorem: If ℕ is a model of a 1st order axiomatization T, then T has a model 
M with an infinite integer. 
Proof:  The model M is constructed as an extension of ℕ by adding a new 
element ∞ with the following atomic relationships: 
                              {∞<∞}  { m<∞ | m:ℕ} 
 It can be shown that M is a model of T with an infinite integer ∞. 
The infinite integer ∞ is a monster that must be banned from the 
mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
 
Theorem: If ℝ is a model of a 1st order axiomatization T, then T has a model 
M with an infinitesimal. 
Proof:  The model M is constructed as an extension of ℝ by adding a new 
element ∞ with the following atomic relationships:  
                      {∞<∞}  {m<∞ | m:ℕ} 
Defining ε to be 
1
∞
 , it follows that ∀[r:ℝ] 0<ε<
1
𝑟
.  It can be shown that M 
is a model of T with an infinitesimal ε, which is a monster that must be 
banned from the mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
 
Jon Barwise 
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On the other hand, since it is not limited to 1st order propositions, Classical Direct 
Logic characterizes structures such as natural numbers and real numbers up to 
isomorphism.i  
 
There are many theorems that cannot be proved from 1st order axioms [Goodstein 
1944, Simpson 1985, Wiles 1995, Bovykin 2009, McLarty 2010].  
 
Unbounded Nondeterminism 
Of greater practical import, 1st order theory is not a suitable foundation for the 
Internet of Things in which specifications require a device respond to a request.ii  
The specification that a computer responds can be formalized as follows:   
∃[i:ℕ] ResponseBefore[i].  However, the specification cannot be proved in a 1st 
order theory. 
Proof:  In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that it is possible to prove 
in a 1st order theory  ∃[i:ℕ] ResponseBefore[i]. Therefore the infinite set 
of propositions {ResponseBefore[i] | i:ℕ} is inconsistent. By the 
compactness theorem of 1st order theory, it follows that there is finite 
subset of the set of propositions that is inconsistent. But this is a 
contradiction, because all the finite subsets are consistent since the 
amount of time before a server responds is unbounded, that is,  
∄[i:ℕ] ⊢ResponseBefore[i]. 
 
However, the above specification axiom does not compute any actual output! 
Instead the above axiom simply asserts the existence of unbounded outputs for 
Unbounded∎[ ]. 
 
  
                                                          
i proving that software developers and computer systems are using the same structures 
ii An implementation of such a system is given below in this article. 
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Theorem. The nondeterministic function defined by Unbounded (earlier in this 
article) cannot be implemented by a nondeterministic Logic Programi or a 
nondeterministic Turing Machine: 
Proof.61 
The task of a nondeterministic Logic Program P is to start with 
an initial set of axioms and prove Output=n for some numeral n. 
Now the set of proofs of P starting from initial axioms will form 
a tree. The branching points will correspond to the 
nondeterministic choice points in the program and the choices 
as to which rules of inference to apply. Since there are always 
only finitely many alternatives at each choice point, the 
branching factor of the tree is always finite. Now König's lemma 
says that if every branch of a finitary tree is finite, then so is the 
tree itself. In the present case this means that if every proof of    P 
proves Output=n for some numeral n, then there are only finitely 
many proofs. So if  P nondeterministically proves Output=n for 
every numeral n, it must contain a nonterminating computation 
in which it does not prove Output=n for some numeral n. 
 
The following arguments support unbounded nondeterminism in the Actor model 
[Hewitt 1985, 2006]: 
 There is no bound that can be placed on how long it takes a computational 
circuit called an arbiter to settle. Arbiters are used in computers to deal 
with the circumstance that computer clocks operate asynchronously with 
input from outside, e.g., keyboard input, disk access, network input, etc.  
So it could take an unbounded time 
for a message sent to a computer to be 
received and in the meantime the 
computer could traverse an 
unbounded number of states. 
 Electronic mail enables unbounded 
nondeterminism since mail can be 
stored on servers indefinitely before 
being delivered. 
 Communication links to servers on the Internet can be out of service 
indefinitely 
 
                                                          
i the lambda calculus is a special case of Logic Programs 
1st order theory is not a 
suitable mathematical 
foundation for Intelligent 
Applications for the 
Internet of Things. 
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As a foundation of mathematics for Computer Science, Classical Direct Logic 
provides categorical62 numbers (integer and real), sets, lists, trees, graphs, etc. 
which can be used in arbitrary mathematical theories including theories for 
categories, large cardinals, etc. These various theories might have “monsters” of 
various kinds. However, these monsters should not imported into models of 
computation used in Computer Science. 
 
Computer Science needs stronger systems than provided by 1st order theory in 
order to weed out unwanted models. In this regard, Computer Science doesn’t 
have a problem computing with “infinite” objects (i.e. Actors) such as π and 
uncountable sets such as the set of real numbers Setℝ. However, the 
mathematical foundation of Computer Science is very different from the general 
philosophy of mathematics in which the infinite integers and infinitesimal reals 
allowed by models of 1st order theories may be of some interest. Of course, it is 
always possible to have special theories that are not part of the foundations with 
infinite integers, infinitesimal reals, unicorns, etc.63  
 
Of course some problems are theoretically not computable. However, even in 
these cases, it is often possible to compute approximations and cases of practical 
interest.i 
  
The mathematical foundation of Computer Science is very different from the 
general philosophy of mathematics in which infinite integers and infinitesimal 
reals may be of some interest. Of course, it is always possible to have special 
theories with infinite integers, infinitesimal reals, unicorns, etc. 
  
                                                          
i e.g. see Terminator [Knies 2006], which practically solves the halting problem for 
device drivers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
Berry Paradox 
The Berry Paradox [Russell 1906] can be formalized using the proposition 
Characterize[s, k] meaning that the string s characterizes the integer k as follows: 
Characterize[s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ, k:ℕ]:PropositionanOrder+1  
                                           ≡  ∀[x:ℕ] s [x] ⇔ x=k 
The Berry Paradox is to construct a string BString for the string for the proposition 
that holds for integer n if and only if every string with length less than 100 does 
not characterize n using the following definition:64 
  BString:StringPropositionanOrder+1ℕ ≡    
         “⦅λ[n:ℕ]  ∀[s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ] 
                                                                  Length[s]<100 ⇨ Characterize[s, n]⦆” 
  Note that 
o Length[BString]<100. 
o {s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ | Length[s]<100} is finite. 
o Therefore,  the following set is finite: 
              {n:ℕ+ |  ∃[s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ] 
                                                                        Length[s]<100  Characterize[s, n]} 
BSet:Setℕ ≡ {n:ℕ+ |  BString [n]} 
BSet≠{  } because is {n:ℕ | n≧1} is infinite. 
 
1. BNumber:ℕ ≡ Least[BSet]  
2.  BString [BNumber]65 
  ⦅λ[n:ℕ] ⦅∀[s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ]  
                                  Length[s]<100 ⇨ Characterize[s, n]⦆ [BNumber]66  
3.  ∀[s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ]  
                                     Length[s]<100 ⇨ Characterize[s, BNumber]67 
4.  Length[BString]<100 ⇨ Characterize[BString, BNumber] 
           // above is invalid because of attempted substitution of 
                 // BString:StringPropositionanOrder+1ℕ for 
  
                      //  s:StringPropositionanOrderℕ 
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Appendix 2. Appendix 1. More Categorical Mathematical Theories  
 
Theory of Nondeterministic Lambda Calculus (Lam τ) 
 
Definition: Functionalτ1,τ2 ≡ [([τ1]→τ2)]→([τ1]→τ2) 
 
Theory Lam  τ   
In addition to Lambda Induction (above), the theory Lam τ has the following 
axioms:i 
• Identityτ1:([τ1]→ τ1) 
Identityτ1∎[f1] = f1 
• Constτ1,τ2:([τ1]→([τ2]→τ1))  
Constτ1, τ2∎[f1]∎[f2] = f1 
• Substτ1, τ2, τ3:([[τ3]→([τ2]→τ4), [τ3]→τ2], τ3] → τ4)68 
Substτ1, τ2, τ3∎[f1]∎[f2]∎[f3] = (f1∎[f3])∎[f2∎[f3]] 
• Fixτ1,τ2:([Functionalτ1,τ2]→Functionalτ1,τ2)69 
Fixτ1,τ2∎[F] = F∎[Fixτ1,τ2∎[F]] 
• Eitherτ1:([τ1] → ([τ1]→τ1))  
Eitherτ1∎[f1]∎[f2]=f1  Eitherτ1∎[f1]∎[f2]=f2 
• Equality Axiom 
∀[f1,f2:([τ1]→τ2)] f1=f2 ⇔ ∀[f3:τ1] f1∎[f3]=f2∎[f3] 
• Lambda Equalityii 
∀[f1:([τ]→τ)] f1=λ[f2:τ] f1∎[f2] 
• Basis: For all f:Λτ, f is equal to a composition of Identity, Const, Subst, 
Fix, and Either. 
 
Theorem. Computational Inadequacy of Nondeterministic Lambda Calculus. 
The nondeterministic lambda calculus is inadequate to implement all 
computable procedures. 
Proof. Fi[j:ℕ] ≡ j>i ⍰  True⦂ InfiniteLoop
 
∎[ ]  False⦂ i either Fi[j+1] 
For each i:ℕ, Fi is a nondeterministic λ expression but (limiti:ℕ Fi) cannot be 
implemented as a nondeterministic λ expression.  However (limiti:ℕ Fi):Actor  
 
  
                                                          
i τ1,τ2,τ3:TypeΛτ 
ii Because of Lambda Equality, the domain of [Scott 2015] is not a valid model of  
Lam  τ. 
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Lambda Induction 
The theorem of Lambda Induction is as follows:i 
∀[P:Proposition1Λτ]  
   (P[Identityτ1]  P[Constτ1, τ2]  P[Substτ1,τ2,τ3]  P[Fixτ1] 
      P[Eitherτ1]   ∀[f1:τ1, f2:τ2] P[f1]P[f2] ⇨ P[Constτ1, τ2∎[f1, f2]] 
     ∀[f1:τ1, f2:τ2, f3:τ3] P[f1]P[f2]P[f3]⇨P[Substτ1,τ2,τ3∎[f1]∎[f2]∎[f3]] 
         ∀[f:([τ1]→τ2)] P[f] ⇨ P[Fixτ1, τ2∎[f]]  
          ∀[f1:τ1, f2:([τ1]→τ2)] P[f1]P[f2]  ⇨ P[f2∎[f1]])  ⇨ ∀[f:Λτ] P[f] 
 
Convergence: ∀[f1:([τ1]→τ2),f2:τ1] f1∎[f2]↓ ⇔ ∃[f3:τ2] f1∎[f2]=f3 
 
Approximation: ∀[f1, f2:([τ1]→τ2)] f1≦f2 ⇔ ∀[f3:τ1] f1∎[f3]↓ ⇒ f1∎[f3]=f2∎[f3] 
 
Bottom:  ⊥τ1∎[f:τ1] ≡ f 
     Note that ∀[f2:τ1] (⊥τ1∎[f2])↓ and ∀[f:([τ1]→τ1)] ⊥τ1≦f 
 
Monotone:   
        F:Monotoneτ1,τ2 ⇔ F:Functionalτ1,τ2  ∀[g:([τ1]→τ2)] g≦F∎[g] 
 
Limit Theorem:  ∀[F:Monotoneτ1,τ1] F=limit𝑖:𝐍+F
i
∎[⊥τ1]70 
 
Theorem: Deterministic procedures have bounded nondeterminism   
           ∀[f:([τ1]→τ1))] Deterministic[f] ⇨ f:Λτ 
 
Theorem: Some nondeterministic procedures have unbounded nondeterminismii   
           ∃[f:([τ1]→τ1))] f:Λτ 
 
  
                                                          
i τ1,τ2,τ3:TypeΛτ 
ii e.g., ones using concurrent Actors.  See discussion in this article. 
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Theorem.i  Lam 
 τ is categorical with a unique isomorphism. 
Proof: Suppose that X satisfies the axioms for Lam  τ.   
       By lambda induction, the isomorphism I:XΛτ is defined as follows:ii 
 I[Identityτ1] ≡ IdentityXτ1 
 I[Constτ1, τ2] ≡ ConstXτ1, τ2 
 I[Substτ1, τ2, τ3] ≡ SubstXτ1, τ2, τ3 
 I[Fixτ1, τ2] ≡ FixXτ1, τ2 
  
 I[Eitherτ1] ≡ EitherXτ1 
 ∀[f1:τ1, f2:([τ1]→τ2)] I[f2∎[f1]] ≡ I[f2]∎X[I[f1]] 
 
I is the unique isomorphism: 
 I is one to one 
 The range of I  is X  
 I is a homomorphism 
 I-1:ΛτX  is a homomorphism 
 I is the unique isomorphism: If g:XΛτ is an isomorphism, then g= I  
 
Theorem (Model Soundness of Lam τ): (⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ) ⇨ ⊨Λτ 
Proof: Suppose ⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ. The theorem immediately follows because the axioms 
for the theory Lam  τ hold in the type Λτ. 
 
Theorem (Indiscernibility for Lam τ):
71 
    ∀[f,g:Λτ]  f=g ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[f]⇔P[g] 
 
Theorem: Logical completeness of Lam τ 
                   ∀[:PropositionLam τ]  (⊨Λτ) ⇒ ⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ 
 
Corollary.  Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Lam  τ, i.e.,  
  ∀[:PropositionLam τ] (⊨Λτ) ⇔ ⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ 
 
                                                          
i cf. [Engeler 1981; Hindley, and Seldin 2008] 
ii τ1,τ2,τ3:TypeΛτ 
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Theorem.  Inferential Decidability of Lam  τ, i.e.,  
                 ∀[P:PropositionLam  τΛτ] 
                                           (⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ ∀[f:Λτ] P[f])  ⊢𝑳𝒂𝒎τ ∃[f:Λτ] P[f] 
 
Theory of Reals (Reals ) 
Reals  is strictly more powerful than the relational 1st order theory of 
RealClosedFields.72 
 
Theorem (Categoricity of Reals ):73  
If X is a type satisfying the axioms74 for the real numbers Reals, then there is a unique 
isomorphism with ℝ. 
 
Theory of Ordinals (Ord ) 
A theory of the ordinals can be axiomatized75 using a 2nd order ordinal induction 
axiom  as follows: For each order:ℕ+ and P:PropositionorderO, 
                   (∀[α:O] ∀[β<α:O] P[β]⇨P[α]) ⇨ ∀[α:O] P[α] 
In order to fill out the ordinals, the following limit axioms are included in Ord : 
• ∀[α:O, f:OO] ⊍α f:O 
• ∀[α,β:O; f:OO] β<⊍αf ⇔ ∃[δ<α] β≦f[δ] 
• ∀[α,β:O; f:OO] (∀[δ<α] f[δ]≦β) ⇨ ⊍αf≦β 
In order to guarantee that there are uncountable ordinals, the following axioms are 
also included in Ord : 
• ω0 = ℕ 
• ∀[α:O] α>0O ⇨ ω α ⋖ 𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧
⊍β<αωβ 
• ∀[α,β:O] β≐ωα ⇨ ωα≦β 
where τ1≐τ2 ⇔ ∃[f:τ2
τ1] 1to1Ontoτ1,τ2[f] 
o 1to1τ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1]   ⇔  ∀[x1,x2:τ1] f[x1]=f[x2] ⇨ x1=x2 
o 1to1Ontoτ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1]  
               ⇔ 1to1τ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1]   ∀[y:τ2] ∃[x:τ1]  f[x]=y 
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Theorem Ordinals have the following properties: 
 Ordinals are well-ordered: 
Least:𝐎𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧
𝐎
 
Least[{ }] = 0O 
∀[S:BooleanO] S≠{ } ⇨ Least[S]∈S 
∀[S:BooleanO] S≠{ } ⇨ ∀[α∈S] Least[S]≦α 
 Reals can be well-ordered because ω1≐ℝ 
 ∀[α:O] ∃[β:O] α<ωβ 
 The set of all ordinals Ω is BooleanO so that:  
             ∀[α:O] α∈Ω ⇔ α:O 
Note that it is not the case that Ω is of type O, thereby thwarting the Burali-
Forti paradox 
 
Theorem (Categoricity of Ord ):  
If X be a type satisfying the axioms the theory of the ordinals Ord
 
, then there is 
a unique isomorphism with O.76 
 
Theorem (Model Soundness of Ord ): (⊢
Ord
 ) ⇨ ⊨O  
Proof: Suppose ⊢
Ord
 . The theorem immediately follows because the axioms 
for the theory Ord 
 
hold in the type O . 
 
Theorem (Indiscernibility for Ord ):77 
    ∀[,:O] = ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[]⇔P[] 
 
Theorem: Logical completeness of Ord  
   ∀[:PropositionOrd ]  (⊨O )⇒ ⊢Ord  
 
Corollary.  Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Ord , i.e.,   
     ∀[:PropositionOrd ]  (⊨O ) ⇔ ⊢Ord   
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Theorem.  Inferential Decidability of Ord , i.e.,  
          ∀[:PropositionOrd O] (⊢
Ord
 )  ⊢
Ord
  
Proof. ∀[:PropositionOrd ] (⊨O )  ⊨O  
Theorem follows from Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Ord. 
 
Type Choice 
      ∀[f:(𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧𝛔)𝛕] ∃[choice:στ]  ∀[x:τ]  f[x]≠{ } ⇨ choice[x]∈f[x] 
 
Sets  τ defined using strong parameterized types 
 
Set Theory 
A theory of the ordinals can be axiomatized using a 2nd order set induction axiom  
as follows: For each order:ℕ+ and P:PropositionorderO: 
  (∀[S:Setτ, α:O] (S≐α ⇨ ∀[X:Setτ, β<α:O] P[X]X≐β ⇨ P[X])  
               ⇨ ∀[S:Setτ] P[S] 
 
The type Setτ can be characterized as follows: 
Setτ ≡ Booleanτ 
Of course set membership is defined as follows: 
∀[x:τ:, S:Setτ]  xS ⇔ S[x]=True 
 
Inductive definition: 
1. Sets0τ ≡ Booleanτ 
2. Setsα+1τ ≡ SetSetsατ 
3. α:LimitO ⇒ (S:Setsατ  ⇔ ∀[X∈S] ∃[β<α:O, Y:Setsβτ] X∈Y) 
S:Setsτ ⇔ ∃[α:O] S:Setsατ 
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The properties below mean that Setsτ is a "universe" of mathematical 
discourse.78  
 Foundation: There are no downward infinite membership chains.79  
 Transitivity of ∈80: ∀[S:Setsτ] ∀[X∈S] X:Setsτ 
 Powerset:81 ∀[S:Setsτ] Booleans:Setsτ 
 Union:82  
          ∀[S:Setsτ] ⋃S:Setsτ 
         ∀[S:Setsτ] ∀[X:Setsτ]  X∈⋃S ⇔  ∃[Y∈S] X∈Y   
 Replacement:83 The function image of any set is also a set, i.e.: 
     Imageτ:𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ[𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ
𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ,𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ] 
     ∀[f:𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ𝐒𝐞𝐭𝐬τ, S:Setsτ] 
                           ∀[y:Setsτ]  yImageτ[f, S] ⇔ ∃[x∈S] f[x]=y 
 
Setsτ is much stronger than relational 1st order ZFC.84 
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Theorem. Sets τ is categorical with a unique isomorphism. 
  Proof:85 Suppose that X satisfies the axioms for Sets τ.   
      By ordinal induction, the isomorphism I:XSetsτ as follows: 
1. S:Sets0τ 
I[S] ≡ S 
2. S:Setsα+1τ 
Z∈XI[S] ⇔ ∃[Y:Setsατ] I[Y]∈XZ   
3. S:Setsατand α:LimitO  
Z∈XI[S]  ⇔ ∃[β<α:O, Y:Setsβτ] I[Y]∈XZ 
4. I is a unique isomorphism: 
 I is one to one 
 The range of I  is X  
 I is a homomorphism:  
o I[{ }Setsτ] = { }X 
o ∀[S1,S2:Setsτ]  I [S1 ∪ S2] =  I[S1] ∪X I [S2] 
o ∀[S1 S2:Setsτ]  I[S1 ∩ S2] =  I[S1] ∩X I[S2] 
o ∀[S1,S2:Setsτ]  I[S1 - S2] =  I[S1] -X I[S2] 
o ∀[S:Setsτ]  I[⋃S] =  ⋃X {I[x] | x∈S} 
 I-1:SetsτX  is a homomorphism 
 I is the unique isomorphism: If g:XSetsτ is an isomorphism,  
then g= I  
 
Theorem (Model Soundness of Sets τ): (⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ) ⇨ ⊨Setsτ 
Proof: Suppose ⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ. The theorem immediately follows because the axioms 
for the theory Sets τ hold in the type Setsτ. 
 
Theorem (Indiscernibility for Sets τ):
86 
    ∀[s1,s2:Setsτ] s1=s2 ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[s1]⇔P[s2] 
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Theorem: Logical completeness of Sets τ 
    ∀[:PropositionSets τSetsτ] (⊨Setsτ) ⇒ ⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ 
 
Corollary.  Equivalence of satisfiability and provability in Sets τ, i.e.,  
   ∀[:PropositionSets τ]  (⊨Setsτ)⇔⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ 
 
Theorem.  Inferential Decidability of Sets  τ, i.e.,  
     ∀[:PropositionSets τ]   (⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ)  ⊢𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔τ 
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Appendix 3:  Notation of Direct Logic 
 
Types i.e., a type is a discrimination 87 of the following:88 
o Boolean::89, ℕ::, O::90 and Act::91 
o Termτ::92, Expressionτ::93, Λτ94, Stringτ::95, and 
Typeτ::96, where τ::97 
o PropositionanOrder::98 and SentenceanOrder:: where 
anOrder:ℕ+ 
o (τ1⦶τ2)::99, [τ1,τ2]::100, ([τ1]→τ2)::101 and 𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏::102 where τ1:: and τ2:: 
o (τ∋| P):: where τ:: and P:Proposition1τ 103 
 
Propositions, i.e., a Proposition is a discrimination of the following: 
o ():τ where :τ and τ:: 
o ,,⇨,(⇔):τ where , :τ and τ:: 
o (p ⍰ True⦂ 1, False⦂ 2):τ104  where p:Boolean, ,:τ and τ:: 
o (x1=x2):Proposition1 where x1,x2:τ and τ:: 
o (s1s2):Proposition1 where s1,s2:Setτ and τ:: 
o (xs):Proposition1 where x:τ, s:Setτ and τ:: 
o (τ1⊑τ2):Proposition1105 where  τ1:: and τ2:: 
o (x::):Proposition1106 
o (x:τ):Proposition1 where τ:: 
o p[x]:PropositionanOrder+1 where x:τ, p:PropositionanOrderτ  
o (1├
𝐩
𝐓
  2):τ 107 where p:Proof, T:Theory, 1:τ, 2:τ and 
τ⊑PropositionanOrder and anOrder:ℕ+  
o (∀τ1 p):τ2i and (∃τ1 p):τ2ii where p:𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏, τ1::, τ⊑PropositionanOrder 
and anOrder:ℕ+  
o (⊨
T ):τ where :τ, T:Theory 108, τ⊑PropositionanOrder and 
anOrder:ℕ+ 
o s:PropositionanOrder where s:SentenceanOrder with no free 
variables and anOrder:ℕ+ 
                                                          
i meaning ∀[x:τ1]:τ2 p[x] 
ii meaning ∃[x:τ1]:τ2 p[x] 
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Grammar (syntax) trees (i.e. terms, expressions and sentences) are defined below. 
 
Terms, i.e., a Termτ is a discrimination of the following: 
o ⦅Boolean⦆:ConstantTypeBoolean, 
⦅ℕ⦆:ConstantTypeℕ, ⦅O⦆:ConstantTypeO and 
⦅Act⦆:ConstantTypeAct 
o x:Termτ where x:Constantτ and τ:: 
o x:Termτ where x:Variableτ and τ:: 
o ⦅f[x:τ1]:τ2 ≡ d in y⦆:Termτ3 where f:Variable𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏 in d and y, 
x:Variableτ1 in d, d:Termτ2, y:Termτ3, and τ1,τ2,τ3:: 109 
o ⦅x:τ1 ≡ d in  y⦆:Termτ2 where x:Variableτ1 in d and y, 
d:Termτ1, y:Termτ2, and τ1,τ2:: 110 
o ⦅t1⦶t2⦆:Termτ1⦶τ2, ⦅[t1, t2]⦆:Term[τ1, τ2], 
⦅[t1]→t2⦆:Term[τ1]→τ2 and ⦅𝐞𝟐
𝐞𝟏⦆:Term𝛕2
𝛕1 where 
t1:Termτ1, t2:Termτ2, τ1:: and τ2:: 
o ⦅t1 ⍰ True⦂ t2 , False⦂ t3⦆:Termτi where t1:TermBoolean, 
t2,t3:Termτ and τ:: 
o ⦅λ[x:τ1]:τ2 t⦆:Term𝛕𝟐
𝛕𝟏 where t:Termτ2, x:Variableτ1 in t, and 
τ1,τ2:: 
o ⦅t[x]⦆:Termτ2 where t:Term𝛕𝟐
𝛕𝟏, x:Termτ1, τ1,τ2:: 
o t:τ where t:Termτ with no free variables and τ::  
  
                                                          
i ⦅if e1 then e2  else e3⦆ 
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Expressions, i.e., an Expressionτ is a discrimination of the following: 
o x:Expressionτ where x:Constantτ and τ:: 
o x:Expressionτ where x:Identifierτ and τ:: 
o ⦅f∎[x:τ1]:τ2 ≡ d in y⦆:Expressionτ3 where f:Identifier𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏 in d 
and y, x:Identifierτ1 in d, d:Expressionτ2, 
y:Expressionτ3, and τ1,τ2,τ3:: 111 
o ⦅x:τ1 ≡ d in  y⦆:Expressionτ2 where x:Identifierτ1 in d and y, 
d:Expressionτ1, y:Expressionτ2, and τ1,τ2:: 112 
o ⦅e1⦶e2⦆:Expressionτ1⦶τ2, ⦅[e1, e2]⦆:Expression[τ1, τ2], 
⦅[e1]→e2⦆:Expression[τ1]→τ2 and ⦅𝐞𝟐𝐞𝟏⦆:Expression𝛕2𝛕1 where 
e1:Expressionτ1, e2:Expressionτ2, τ1:: and τ2:: 
o ⦅e1 ⍰ True⦂ e2 , False⦂ e3⦆:Expressionτi where 
e1:ExpressionBoolean, e2,e3:Expressionτ and τ:: 
o ⦅λ[x:τ1]τ2 e⦆:Expression𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏 where e:Expressionτ2, 
x:Identifierτ1 in e, and τ1,τ2:: 
o ⦅e∎[x]⦆:Expressionτ2 where e:Expression[τ1]→τ2, 
x:Expressionτ1, τ1:: and τ2:: 
o SentenceanOrder⊑TermSentenceanOrder and 
SentenceanOrder⊑ExpressionSentenceanOrder where 
anOrder:ℕ+ii 
o e :τ where e:Expressionτ with no free identifiers and τ::  
  
                                                          
i ⦅if e1 then e2  else e3⦆ 
ii Sentences are both Terms and Expressions in order to facilitate writing functions and 
procedures over Terms. 
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Sentences, i.e., a Sentence is a discrimination of the following: 
o ⦅x⦆:SentenceanOrder+1i where 
x:VariableSentenceanOrder and anOrder:ℕ+ 
o ⦅s⦆:τ where s:τ and τ:: 
o ⦅s1s2⦆,⦅s1s2⦆,⦅s1⇨s2⦆,⦅s1⇔s2⦆:τ where s1,s2:τ and τ:: 
o ⦅e ⍰ True⦂ s1, False⦂ s2⦆ii:τ where e:ExpressionBoolean, s1,s2:τ and 
τ:: 
o ⦅e1=e2⦆:Sentence1 where e1,e2:Expressionτ and τ:: 
o ⦅e1⊑e2⦆:Sentence1 where e1,e2:Expressionτ1, τ1:τ2  and τ2:: 
o ⦅e1e2⦆:Sentence1 where e1,e2:ExpressionSetτ and τ:: 
o ⦅e1e2⦆:Sentence1 where e1:ExpressionSetτ, 
e2:ExpressionSetτ and τ:: 
o ⦅e1:e2⦆:Sentence1 where e1:Expressionτ1, e2:Expressionτ2  
and τ1,τ2:: 
o ⦅e::⦆:Sentence1 where e:Expressionτ and τ:: 
o ⦅∀[x:τ1]:τ2 s⦆:τ2 and ⦅∃[x:τ1]:τ2 s⦆:τ2 where x:Variableτ1, s:τ2 and τ1,τ2:: 
o ⦅p[x]⦆:SentenceanOrder+1113 where x:Expressionτ, 
p:ExpressionSentenceanOrder
Expressionτ
, τ:: and 
anOrder:ℕ+  114 
o ⦅s1├
𝐩
𝐓
 s2⦆:τ where T:ExpressionTheory, s1:τ, s2:τ, 
p:ExpressionProof and τ:: 
o ⦅⊨T s⦆:τ where s:τ, T:ExpressionTheory and τ:: 
o SentenceanOrder⊑TermSentenceanOrder and 
SentenceanOrder⊑ExpressionSentenceanOrder where 
anOrder:ℕ+115 
o s:PropositionanOrder where s:SentenceanOrder, anOrder:ℕ+ 
and there are no free variables in s.iii 
  
                                                          
i The type of ⦅x⦆ means that the Y fixed point construction cannot be used to construct 
sentences for “self-referential” propositions in Direct Logic. 
ii if e then s1 else s1 
iii The type binding achieves much of what Russel sought to achieve in the ramified 
theory of types. [Russell and Whitehead 1910-1913] 
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Strings for sentences, i.e., a string for a sentence is a discrimination of the 
following where anOrder:ℕ+: 
o “x”:StringSentenceanOrder+1116 where  
  
x:VariableStringSentenceanOrder and 
o “"" s”:τ where s:τ and τ⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o “s1 "" s2”,“s1 "" s2”,“s1 "⇨" s2”,“s1 "⇔" s2”:τ where s1,s2:τ and 
τ⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o “e "⍰" "True⦂" s1 "," "False⦂" s2”:τ where 
e:StringExpressionBoolean, s1,s2:τ and 
τ⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o “e1 "=" e2”:StringSentence1 where 
e1,e2:StringExpressionτ and τ⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o “e1 "⊑" e2”:StringSentence1 where e1,e2:StringTermτ1, 
τ1:τ2  and τ2:: 
o “e1 "" e2”:StringSentence1 where 
e1,e2:StringTermSetτ and τ:: 
o “e1 "" e2”:StringSentence1 where e1:StringTermτ, 
e2:StringTermSetτ and τ:: 
o “e1 ":" e2”:StringSentence1 where e1:StringExpressionτ1, 
e2:StringExpressionτ2, τ1:τ3, τ2:τ4 and τ3,τ4:: 
o “e "::"”:StringSentenceanOrder where 
e:StringExpressionτ and τ:: 
o “"∀[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2 s”:τ2 and “"∃[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2 s”:τ2 where 
x:Variableτ1, s:τ2 and τ1,τ2⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o “p "[" x "]"”:StringSentenceanOrder+1i where 
x:StringExpressionτ, τ:: , 
p:StringExpressionSentenceanOrder
StringExpressionτ
,  
o “s1 "├" 
𝐩
𝐓
  s2”:τ where T:StringExpressionTheory, s1:τ, s2:τ 
p:StringExpressionProof and τ⊑StringSentenceanOrder 
o StringSentenceanOrder⊑StringTermSentenceanOrder and 
StringSentenceanOrder⊑StringExpressionSentenceanOrder117 
o s:SentenceanOrder where s:StringSentenceanOrder   
                                                          
i The type of “p "[" x "]"” means that the Y fixed point construction cannot be used to 
construct strings for “self-referential” propositions in Direct Logic.  
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String for terms, i.e., a string for a term is a discrimination of the following: 
o x:StringTermτ where x:StringConstantτ and τ:: 
o x: StringTermτ where x:StringVariableτ and τ:: 
o “"⦅" f  "[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2 "≡" d "in" y "⦆"”:StringTermτ3 where 
f:StringVariable𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏 in d and y, x:StringVariableτ1 in d, 
d:StringTermτ2, y:StringTermτ3, and τ1,τ2,τ3:: 118 
o “"⦅" x ":" τ1 "≡" d "in" y "⦆"”:StringTermτ2 where 
x:StringVariableτ1 in d and y, d:StringTermτ1, 
y:StringTermτ2, and τ1,τ2:: 119 
o “"⦅" e1 "⦶" e2 "⦆"”:StringTermτ1⦶τ2, 
o “"⦅" "[" e1 "," e2"]" "⦆"”:StringTerm[τ1,τ2],  
“"⦅" "[" e1 "]→" e2 "⦆"”:StringTerm[τ1]→τ2, and  
“"⦅" 𝐞𝟐
𝐞𝟏  "⦆"”:StringTerm𝛕2
𝛕1 where e1:StringTermτ1, 
e2:StringTermτ2, and τ1:: and τ2:: 
o “"⦅" e1 "⍰" "True⦂" e2 "," "False⦂" e3 "⦆"”:StringTermτi where 
e1:StringTermBoolean, e2,e3:StringTermτ and τ:: 
o “"⦅" "λ[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2  e "⦆"”:StringTerm𝛕𝟐
𝛕𝟏 where 
e:StringTermτ2, x:StringVariableτ1 in e, and τ1,τ2:: 
o “"⦅" e "[" x "]" "⦆"”:StringTermτ2 where e:StringTerm𝛕𝟐
𝛕𝟏, 
x:StringTermτ1, τ1:: and τ2:: 
o StringSentenceanOrder⊑StringTermSentenceanOrder 
where anOrder:ℕ+ 
o e:Termτ, where e:StringTermτ and τ::  
  
                                                          
i “if e1 then e2  else e3” 
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 String for expressions, i.e., a string for an expression is a discrimination of the 
following: 
o x:StringExpressionτ where x:StringConstantτ and τ:: 
o x: StringExpressionτ where x:StringVariableτ and τ:: 
o “"⦅" f "∎[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2 "≡" d "in" y "⦆"”:StringExpressionτ3 where 
f:StringVariable𝛕𝟐𝛕𝟏 in d and y, x:StringVariableτ1 in d, 
d:StringExpressionτ2, y:StringExpressionτ3, and τ1,τ2,τ3:: 
120 
o “"⦅" x ":" τ1 "≡" d "in"  y "⦆"”:StringExpressionτ2 where 
x:StringVariableτ1 in d and  d:StringExpressionτ1, 
y:StringExpressionτ2, and τ1,τ2:: 121 
o  “"⦅" e1 "⦶" e2 "⦆"”:StringExpressionτ1⦶τ2, 
“"⦅" "[" e1 "," e2"]" "⦆"”:StringExpression[τ1,τ2],  
“"⦅" "[" e1 "]→" e2 "⦆"”:StringExpression[τ1]→τ2, and 
“"⦅" 𝐞𝟐
𝐞𝟏  "⦆"”:StringExpression𝛕2
𝛕1 where 
e1:StringExpressionτ1, e2:StringExpressionτ2, and τ1,τ2:: 
“"⦅" e1 "⍰" "True⦂" e2 "," "False⦂" e3 "⦆"”:StringExpressionτi where 
e1:StringExpressionBoolean, e2,e3:StringExpressionτ 
and τ:: 
“"⦅" "λ[" x ":" τ1 "]:" τ2  e "⦆"”:StringExpression[τ1]→τ2 where 
e:StringExpressionτ2, x:StringVariableτ1 in e, and τ1,τ2:: 
“"⦅" e "∎[" x "]" "⦆"”:Expressionτ2 where e:Expression[τ1]→τ2, 
x:Expressionτ1, τ1:: and τ2:: 
o StringSentenceanOrder⊑StringTermSentenceanOrder and 
StringSentenceanOrder⊑StringExpressionSentenceanOrder 
where anOrder:ℕ+ 
e:Expressionτ, where e:StringExpressionτ and τ::  
  
                                                          
i “if e1 then e2  else e3” 
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End Notes 
 
 
1 Performance of computer information systems is measured in consumption of 
processing cycles and storage space as well as latency for response. Pervasive 
inconsistency for information systems means that there are numerous 
inconsistencies that cannot be readily found and that many of the ones that are 
found cannot be easily removed. 
2 [White 1956, Wilder 1968, Rosental 2008] 
3 In other words, the paradox that concerned [Church 1934] (because it could 
mean the demise of formal mathematical logic) has been transformed into 
fundamental theorem of foundations! 
4 Which is not the same as proving the much stronger proposition that 
Mathematics is inferentially consistent, i.e., that there is no proof of 
contradiction from the axioms and inference rules of Direct Logic. 
5 Mathematical foundations of Computer Science must be general, rigorous, 
realistic, and as simple as possible. There are a large number of highly technical 
aspects with complicated interdependencies and trade-offs. Foundations will be 
used by humans and computer systems. Contradictions in the mathematical 
foundations of Computer Science cannot be allowed and if found must be 
repaired. 
     Classical mathematics is the subject of this article. In a more general context: 
 Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is for pervasively inconsistent theories 
of practice, e.g., theories for climate modeling and for modeling the 
human brain. 
 Classical Direct Logic can be freely used in theories of Inconsistency 
Robust Direct Logic. See [Hewitt 2010] for discussion of Inconsistency 
Robust Direct Logic. Classical Direct Logic for mathematics used in 
inconsistency robust theories. 
6 cf. [Rosental 2008] 
7 According to [Concoran 2001]: 
“after first-order  logic had been isolated and had been assimilated by the 
logic community, people emerged who could not accept the idea that first-
order logic was not comprehensive. These logicians can be viewed not as 
conservatives who want to reinstate an outmoded tradition but rather as 
radicals who want to overthrow an established tradition [of Dedekind, 
etc.].” 
8 for discussion see [Hewitt 2010] 
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9 in an unlawful way (Einstein, a member of the editorial board, refused to 
support Hilbert's action) 
10 Hilbert letter to Brouwer, October 1928 
11 Gödel said “Has Wittgenstein lost his mind?” 
12 For example: 
From: Harvey Friedman 
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 10:53 
To: Carl Hewitt 
Cc: Martin Davis @cs.nyu; Dana Scott @cmu; Eric Astor @uconn; Mario Carneiro 
@osu; Dave Mcallester @ttic; Joe Shipman 
Subject: Re: Parameterized types in the foundations of mathematics 
 
Not if I have anything to say about it! 
 
Harvey 
 
On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Carl Hewitt wrote: 
 
> Hi Martin, 
> 
> Please post the message below to FOM [Foundations of Mathematics 
forum]. 
> 
> Thanks! 
> 
> Carl 
> 
> According to Harvey Friedman on the FOM Wiki:  "I have not yet seen any 
seriously alternative foundational setup that tries to be better than ZFC in this 
[categoricity of models] and other respects that isn't far far worse than ZFC in 
other even more important respects." 
> 
> Of course, ZFC is a trivial consequence of parameterized types with the 
following definition for set of type τ: 
> 
>        Setτ ≡ Booleanτ 
 
>> Also of course, classical mathematics can be naturally formalized  using 
parameterized types.  For example, see “Inconsistency 
Robustness in Foundations: Mathematics self proves its own Consistency and 
Other Matters” in HAL Archives. 
>  
> Regards, 
> Carl 
13 [Nielsen 2014] 
14 By the Computational Representation Theorem [Hewitt 2006], which can 
define all the possible executions of a procedure. 
15 highlighted below 
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16 Again, Mathematics here means the common foundation of all classical 
mathematical theories from Euclid to the mathematics used to prove Fermat's 
Last [McLarty 2010].  
17 Note that the results in [Löb 1955] do not apply because propositions in 
Mathematics are strongly typed and consequently the fixed point used to 
establish his result does not exist.  See discussion of Löb’s Paradox in this 
article. 
18 Note that the results in [Gödel 1931] do not apply because propositions in 
Mathematics are strongly typed and consequently the fixed point used 
construct Gödel’s proposition I’mUnprovable does not exist in Mathematics. 
See the critique of Gödel’s results in this article. 
19 As shown above, there is a simple proof in Classical Direct Logic that 
Mathematics (├) is formally consistent. If Classical Direct Logic has a bug, then 
there might also be a proof that Mathematics is inconsistent. Of course, if a such 
a bug is found, then it must be repaired. The Classical Direct Logic proof that 
Mathematics (├) is formally consistent is very robust. One explanation is that 
formal consistency is built in to the very architecture of Mathematics because it 
was designed to be consistent. Consequently, it is not absurd that there is a 
simple proof of the formal consistency of Mathematics (├) that does not use all 
of the machinery of Classical Direct Logic. 
    The usefulness of Classical Direct Logic depends crucially on the much 
stronger proposition that Mathematics is inferentially consistent, i.e., that there 
is no proof of contradiction from the sentences for the axioms using the 
inference rules of Direct Logic. Good evidence for the inferential consistency 
of Mathematics comes from the way that Classical Direct Logic avoids the 
known paradoxes. Humans have spent millennia devising paradoxes.        
          In reaction to paradoxes, philosophers developed the dogma of the necessity 
of strict separation of “object theories” (theories about basic mathematical 
entities such as numbers) and “meta theories” (theories about theories). This 
linguistic separation can be very awkward in Computer Science. Consequently, 
Direct Logic does not have the separation in order that some propositions can 
be more “directly” expressed. For example, Direct Logic can use ├├Ψ to 
express that it is provable that Ψ is provable in Mathematics. It turns out in 
Classical Direct Logic that ├├Ψ holds if and only if ├Ψ holds. By using such 
expressions, Direct Logic contravenes the philosophical dogma that the 
proposition ├├Ψ must be expressed using Gödel numbers. 
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20 [Gödel 1931] based incompleteness results on the thesis that Mathematics 
necessarily has the proposition I'mUnprovable using what was later called the 
“Diagonal Lemma” [Carnap 1934], which is equivalent to the Y untyped fixed 
point operator on propositions. Using strong parameterized types, it is 
impossible to construct I'mUnprovable because the Y untyped fixed point 
operator does not exist for strongly typed propositions. In this way, formal 
consistency of Mathematics is preserved without giving up power because there 
do not seem to be any practical uses for I'mUnprovable in Computer Science. 
        A definition of NotProvable could be attempted as follows: 
                   NotProvable[p] ≡ ⊬p  
   With strong types, the attempted definition becomes: 
        NotProvablen:ℕ+[p:Propositionn]:Propositionn+1 ≡ ⊬p 
   Consequently, there is no fixed point I'mUnprovable for the procedure 
NotProvablen:ℕ+ such that the following holds:  
                    NotProvablen:ℕ+[I'mUnprovable]⇔I'mUnprovable 
   Thus Gödel’s I'mUnprovable does not exist in Strongly Typed Mathematics.  
    In arguing against Wittgenstein’s criticism, Gödel maintained that his results 
on I'mUnprovable followed from properties of ℕ using Gödel numbers for 
strings that are well-formed. The procedure NotProvable could be attempted for 
strings as follows: NotProvable[s] ≡ “⊬ s” With strong types, the attempted 
definition becomes: 
     NotProvablen:ℕ+[s:StringPropositionn]:StringPropositionn+1 ≡ “"⊬" s” 
Consequently, there is no fixed point I'mUnprovableString for the procedure 
NotProvablen:ℕ+ such that the following holds (where  s  is the proposition 
for well-formed string s):  
     NotProvablen:ℕ+ [I'mUnprovableString] ⇔ I'mUnprovableString 
   Thus Gödel’s I'mUnprovableString does not exist in Strongly Typed 
Mathematics.    
        Furthermore, Strong Types thwart the known paradoxes while at the same 
time facilitating proof of new theorems, such as categoricity of the set theory. 
21 Total[f] ⇔ ∀[i:ℕ] ∃[j:ℕ] f∎[i] = j 
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22 ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i:ℕ]:([ℕ]→ℕ)) ≡ Next∎[i, 0, 0] 
   Next∎[i:ℕ, totalsIterator:ℕ, theoremsIterator:ℕ]:([ℕ]→ℕ)) ≡  
        TheoremsEnumerator[theoremsIterator]  ⍰ 
              Total[f] ⦂             // TheoremsEnumerator[theoremsIterator]=Total[f] 
                    totalsIterator=i ⍰ 
                        True ⦂ f, 
                        False⦂ Next∎[i, totalsIterator+1, theoremsIterator+1] 
               else ⦂ Next∎[i, totalsIterator, theoremsIterator+1] 
Theorem ⊢Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator]  
    Proof: ProvedTotalsEnumerator always converges because. 
      ⊢∀[i:ℕ] ∃[j:ℕ, g:([ℕ]→ℕ)] j>i  TheoremsEnumerator∎[j]=Total[g] 
23 [Isaacson 2007] 
24 A theory is defined by a set of propositions in Direct Logic that are taken to be 
axioms of the theory. 
25 The whole induction axiom is of type Proposition2.  However, ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
within the induction axiom is of type Proposition1.  Quine famously 
criticized 2nd order theory as nothing more than “set theory in sheep’s 
clothing” [Quine 1970, pg. 66]. However, the induction axiom is a more 
natural axiomatization of the Natural Numbers than the 1st order induction 
schema which provides an infinitely large number of axioms. 
Theorem.  ∀[X:Booleanℕ]  (0∈X  ∀[i:ℕ] i∈X⇨i+1∈X) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] i∈X 
    Proof:  Suppose X:Booleanℕ. P[i:ℕ]:Proposition1 ≡ i∈X.  The theorem 
follows immediately. 
Theorem. Set theory version of the Natural Number induction axiom implies 
propositional version. 
Proof: Suppose ∀[X:Boolean1ℕ] (0∈X∀[i:ℕ] i∈X⇨i+1∈X) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] i∈X 
Further suppose P:Proposition1ℕ. Define X:Booleanℕ ≡ {i:ℕ | P[i]}. 
It follows that (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]⇨P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]. 
26 highlighted below 
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27 Prove by induction that ∀[i:ℕ] ∀[j:ℕ]  i=j ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[i]⇔P[j] 
Suppose the following: (∀[i,j<k:ℕ]  i=j ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[i]⇔P[j]) 
Show ∀[i,j≤k+1:ℕ]  i=j ⇔ ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  P[i]⇔P[j] Suppose 
i,j≤k+1:ℕ and P:Proposition1ℕ such that  P[i]⇔P[j]. To show i=j, consider 
the following cases: 
 i,j<k then i=j by inductive hypothesis 
 i=k+1 and j<k then define Q[m:ℕ] ≡ (m=k+1). Applying the inductive 
hypothesis for Q[j], i=k+1⇔j=k+1  ∴ i=j 
 j=k+1 and i<k then define Q[m:ℕ] ≡ (m=k+1). Applying the inductive 
hypothesis for Q[i], j=k+1⇔i=k+1  ∴ i=j 
 i=j=k+1 then i=j 
28 [Dedekind 1888] According to [Isaacson 2007]: 
“Second-order quantification is significant for philosophy of mathematics 
since it is the means by which mathematical structures may be 
characterized. But it is also significant for mathematics itself. It is the means 
by which the significant distinction can be made between the independence 
of Euclid's Fifth postulate from the other postulates of geometry and the 
independence of Cantor's Continuum hypothesis [conjecture] from the 
axioms of set theory. The independence of the Fifth postulate rejects the 
fact, which can be expressed and established using second-order logic, that 
there are different geometries, in one of which the Fifth postulate holds (is 
true), in others of which it is false.” 
29 cf. [Genesereth and Kao 2015; Zohar 2017] 
30 cf. [Zermelo 1932]  pp. 6-7. 
31 Examples:   
o ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ]  (⊨ℕ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i])⇒ ⊢Nat ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
Suppose in Nat   , P:Proposition1ℕ and  ⊨ℕ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]. Further 
suppose to obtain a contradiction that ∀[i:ℕ] P[i]. Therefore ∃[i:ℕ] 
P[i] and by Existential Elimination P[i0] where i0:ℕ, which 
contradicts ⊨ℕ P[i0], from the hypothesis of the theorem. Therefore 
⊢
Nat 
∀[i:ℕ] P[i] using proof by contradiction in Nat. 
o ∀[P:Proposition1ℕ] (⊨ℕ ∃[i:ℕ] P[i])⇒ ⊢Nat ∃[i:ℕ] P[i] 
Suppose in Nat   , P:Proposition1ℕ and  ⊨ℕ ∃[i:ℕ] P[i]. Further 
suppose to obtain a contradiction that ∃[i:ℕ] P[i] and therefore ∀[i:ℕ] 
P[i]. However, ⊨ℕ P[i0] where i0:ℕ, which contradicts P[i0]. 
Therefore ⊢
Nat 
∃[i:ℕ] P[i] using proof by contradiction in Nat. 
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32 often misleading called -consistency [Gödel 1931] 
33 often misleading called -consistency [Gödel 1931] 
34  Proof: Suppose to obtain a contradiction that ProvablyComputableR is 
computationally enumerable by  
              ProvablyComputableEnumerator:([ℕ]→ProvablyComputableR). 
           Diagonal∎[i:ℕ]:ℕ ≡ 1+ (ProvablyComputableEnumerator∎[i])∎[i] 
Diagonal is not in the range of ProvablyComputableEnumerator, which is a 
contradiction.  QED. 
    The above proof builds on the argument in the following theorem: 
Theorem [Cantor 1891].  ℕℕ is not countable. 
Proof.  For proof by contradiction, suppose that is ℕℕ countable by a 
procedure FunctionEnumerator:ℕℕ
ℕ
.   
          Diagonal[n] ≡ 1+(FunctionEnumerator [n])[n]   
Diagonal is not in the range of FunctionEnumerator, which is a 
contradiction. QED. 
35 This argument appeared in [Church 1934] expressing concern that the argument 
meant that there is “no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing as 
logic.” 
36 ProvedTotalsEnumerator∎[i:ℕ]:([ℕ]→ℕ)) ≡ Next∎[i, 0, 0] 
   Next∎[i:ℕ, totalsIterator:ℕ, theoremsIterator:ℕ]:([ℕ]→ℕ)) ≡  
        TheoremsEnumerator[theoremsIterator]  ⍰ 
              Total[f] ⦂             // TheoremsEnumerator[theoremsIterator]=Total[f] 
                    totalsIterator=i ⍰ 
                        True⦂ f, 
                         False⦂ Next∎[i, totalsIterator+1, theoremsIterator+1] 
               else ⦂ Next∎[i, totalsIterator, theoremsIterator+1] 
Theorem ⊢Nat Total[ProvedTotalsEnumerator]  
 Proof: ProvedTotalsEnumerator always converges because. 
        ⊢Nat ∀[i:ℕ] ∃[j:ℕ,g:([ℕ]→ℕ)] j>i  TheoremsEnumerator∎[j]=Total[g] 
37 The theorems themselves can be represented as character strings because 
totality can be expressed as the abstraction of a character string and each 
procedure can be represented as the abstraction of a character string. 
38 Theorem. There are uncountably many countable ordinals (order types). 
    Totality proofs have countable ordinals of arbitrarily high degree. 
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39 of type [Com]→ 
       Outcome[created= FiniteSetActor,     // new Actors 
                          sent= FiniteSetCom,      // new Communications 
                          next= Behavior] 
40 Consequently, there can cannot be any escape hatch into an unformalized 
“meta-theory.” 
41 The claim also relied on Gödel's proposition I'mUnprovable. 
42 Fixed points exist for types other than propositions. 
43 emphasis in original 
44 [Gödel 1931] was accepted doctrine by mainstream logicians for over eight 
decades. 
45 According to Solomon Feferman, Gödel was “the most important logician of 
the 20th century” and according to John Von Neumann he was “the greatest 
logician since Aristotle.” [Feferman 1986, pg. 1 and 8] 
46 [Feferman 1986, pg. 1 and 8] 
47 Wittgenstein in 1937 published in Wittgenstein 1956, p. 50e and p. 51e] 
48 Wittgenstein was granting the supposition that [Gödel 1931] had proved 
inferential undecidability (sometimes called “incompleteness”) of Russell’s 
system, that is., ⊢⊬P. However, inferential undecidability is easy to prove 
using the proposition P where P⇔⊬P:  
Proof. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that ⊢
 
P. Both of the following can 
be inferred:  
1) ⊢
 
⊬P from the hypothesis because P⇔⊬P 
2) ⊢
 
⊢P from the hypothesis by Adequacy. 
But 1) and 2) are a contradiction. Consequently, ⊢⊬
 
P follows from proof by 
contradiction. 
49 [Wang 1972] 
50 The Liar Paradox [Eubulides of Miletus] is an example of using untyped 
propositions to derive an inconsistency:  
         Fn[p:Propositionn]:Propositionn+1  ≡  p 
       // above definition has no fixed point because p has 
             // order greater than p 
The following argument derives a contradiction assuming the existence of a 
fixed point for F:   
1) I’mFalse ⇔  I’mFalse       // nonexistent fixed point of F 
2) I’mFalse                              // proof by contradiction from 1) 
3) I’mFalse                                 // from 1) and 2) 
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51 [Church 1935]  correctly proved computational undecidability  without using 
Gödel's I’mUnprovable. The Church theorem and its proof are very robust. 
52 in accord with the opinion of a large fraction of contemporary philosophers of 
logic 
53 In other words, the paradox that concerned [Church 1934] (because it could 
mean the demise of formal mathematical logic) has been transformed into 
fundamental theorem of foundations! 
54 Which is not the same as proving the much stronger proposition that 
Mathematics is inferentially consistent, i.e., that there is no proof of 
contradiction from the axioms and inference rules of Direct Logic. 
55 Theorem: ⊢
Nat
 ∀[P:StringProposition1ℕ]  
                                     ( P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]  P[i]⇨P[i+1]) ⇨ ∀[i:ℕ] P[i] 
56 In 1666, England's House of Commons introduced a bill against atheism and 
blasphemy, singling out Hobbes’ Leviathan. Oxford university condemned and 
burnt Leviathan four years after the death of Hobbes in 1679. 
57 ContinuumForReals is defined as follows: 
         ContinuumForReals ⇔  ∄[S:Booleanℕ] ℕ ⋖ S ⋖ Booleanℕ 
ContinuumForReals has been proved for well-behaved subsets of the reals, 
such as Borel sets as follows: 
          ContinuumForBorelSets ⇔  ∄[S:BorelSet] ℕ ⋖ S ⋖ Booleanℕ 
 where a BorelSet is formed from the countable union, countable 
intersection, and relative complement of open sets 
That ContinuumForReals is an open problem is not so important for Computer 
Science because for ContinuumForComputableReals is immediate because the 
computable real numbers are enumerable. 
For less well behaved subset of ℝ, ContinuumForReals remains an open 
problem. 
    Note that it is important not to confuse ContinuumForReals with 
ContinuumForRelational1stOrderZFC. Relational1stOrderZFC has 
countably many 1st order propositions as axioms. [Cohen 1963] proved the 
following theorem which is much weaker than ContinuumForReals because 
sets in the models of Relational1stOrderZFC do not include all of 
Proposition1ℕ and the theory Relational1stOrderZFC is much 
weaker than the theory Sets ℕ: 
 ⊬
Relational1stOrderZFC ContinuumForRelational1stOrderZFC 
 ⊬
Relational1stOrderZFC ContinuumForRelational1stOrderZFC 
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Cohen's result above is very far from being able to decide the following: 
    ⊦𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒔ℕ  ContinuumForReals 
58 [Zermelo 1930, van Dalen 1998, Ebbinghaus 2007] 
59 1st order theories fall prey to paradoxes like the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems 
(e.g. any 1st order theory of the real numbers has a countable model). Theorists 
have used the weakness of 1st order theory to prove results that do not hold in 
stronger formalisms such as Direct Logic [Cohen 1963, Barwise 1985]. 
60 a restricted form of Model Checking in which the properties checked are 
limited to those that can be expressed in Linear-time Temporal Logic has 
been studied [Clarke, Emerson, Sifakis, etc. ACM 2007 Turing Award]. 
61 cf. Plotkin [1976] 
62 up to a unique isomorphism 
63 Rejection of the 1st Order Thesis resolves the seeming paradox between the 
formal proof in this article that Mathematics formally proves its own formal 
consistency and the proof that ‘Every “strong enough” formal system that 
admits a proof of its own consistency is actually inconsistent.’ [Paulson 2014].  
Although Mathematics is “strong enough,” the absence of “self-referential” 
propositions (constructed using the Y untyped fixed point operator on 
propositions) blocks the proof of formal inconsistency to which Paulson 
referred.  
64 Note that the Berry paradox is blocked using strong types because BString is a 
string for a term of a proposition of anOrder+1 thereby preventing it from 
being substituted for a string for a term of a proposition of anOrder. 
65 using definition of BSet 
66 using definition of BExpression 
67 substituting BNumber for n 
68 Subst is the substitution procedure, which substitutes its third argument 
into the application of its first two arguments 
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69 Fix implements recursion. It can be defined in Direct Logic as follows; 
       Fixτ1,τ1∎[F:Functionalτ1,τ1]:([τ1]→τ2)  
                                                                         ≡ λ[x:τ1] (F∎[Fixτ1,τ1∎[F]] )∎[x]   
For example, suppose  
                F[g:[ℕ]→ℕ]:([ℕ]→ℕ) ≡ λ[i:ℕ] i=1  ⍰ True⦂ 1 , False⦂ ig∎[i-1] 
Therefore by the Fix axiom,  Fixℕ, ℕ∎[F]=F∎[Fixℕ, ℕ∎[F]] and  
Fixℕ, ℕ∎[F] = F∎[Factorial] = Factorial where 
                             Factorial ≡ λ[i:ℕ] i=1  ⍰ True⦂ 1 , False⦂ iFactorial∎[i-1] 
70 where F1∎[x] ≡ F∎[x] 
              Fn+1∎[x]  ≡ Fn∎[F∎[x]] 
 
71 Prove by induction on f,g:Λτ   
72 Robinson [1961] 
73 [Dedekind 1888] 
74 The following can be used to characterize the real numbers (ℝ) up to a unique 
isomorphism: 
     ∀[S:Setℝ]  S≠{ }  Bounded[S] ⇨ HasLeastUpperBound[S] 
 where   
    Bounded[S:Setℝ] ⇔ ∃[b:ℝ] UpperBound[b, S]  
    UpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] ⇔  bS  ∀[xS] x≦b 
    HasLeastUpperBound[S:Setℝ]]  ⇔ ∃[b:ℝ] LeastUpperBound[b, S] 
    LeastUpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] 
                    ⇔  UpperBound[b,S]  ∀[xS] UpperBound[x, S] ⇨ x≦b 
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75 The theory of the ordinals Ord  is axiomatised as follows: 
 0O:O 
 Successor ordinals 
o ∀[α:O]  +1[α]:O  +1[α]>α 
o ∀[α:O]  ∄[β:O]  α<β<+1[α] 
 Replacement for ordinals: 
o ∀[α:O,f:OO] ⊍αf:O 
o ∀[α,β:O,f:OO] β∈⊍αf ⇔ ∃[δ<α] β≦f[δ] 
o ∀[α,β:O,f:OO] (∀[δ<α] f[δ]≦β) ⇨ ⊍αf≦β 
 Cardinal ordinals 
ω0 = ℕ 
∀[α:O] α>0O ⇨ ω α≐𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧
⊍β<αωβ 
∀[α,β:O] β≐ωα ⇨ ωα=β  ωα∈β 
        where τ1≐τ2 ⇔ ∃[f:τ2
τ1] 1to1ontoτ1,τ2[f] 
                 1to1τ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1] ⇔  ∀[x1,x2:τ1] f[x1]=f[x2] ⇨ x1=x2 
            1to1ontoτ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1]  
                                      ⇔ 1to1τ1 ,τ2[f:τ2
τ1]   ∀[y:τ2] ∃[x:τ1]  f[x]=y 
 Tansitivity of < 
∀[α,β<α,δ<β:O]  α<δ 
 ∀[α,β:O]  α<β  α=β  β<α 
 ∀[α,β:O]  α<β ⇨ β<α 
 The following ordinal induction axiom holds: 
   ∀[P:PropositionorderO] 
                                             (∀[α:O] ∀[β<α:O] P[β]⇨P[α]) ⇨ ∀[α:O] P[α] 
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76 For each type X that satisfies the theory Ord  there is a unique isomorphism 
I:XO inductively defined as follows: 
             I[0O] ≡ 0X 
             ∀[α:O] I[+1[α]] ≡ +1
𝐗[I[α]] 
          ∀[α:LimitO] I[α] ≡ y 
              where y:X  ∀[β<α] y≦XI[β] 
                                    ∀[z:X] (∀[β<α] z≦XI[β]) ⇒ y≦Xz 
Using proofs by ordinal induction on O and X, the following follow: 
1. I is defined for every O 
2. I is one-to-one: ∀[α,β:O] I[α] = I[β] ⇒ α=β 
3. The range of I is all of X: ∀[y:X] ∃[α:O] I[α] = y 
4. I is a homomorphism:  
 I[0O] = 0X 
 ∀[α:O] I[+1[α]] = +1
𝐗[I[α]] 
 ∀[α:LimitO, f:OO] I[⊍α f] =  ⊍f[α]
𝐱
I⚬f⚬I-1 
5. I-1:OX is a homomorphism 
6. I is the unique isomorphism:  If g:XO is an isomorphism then g=I 
77 Prove by ordinal induction on ,:O 
78 [Bourbaki 1972; Fantechi, et. al. 2005] 
79 This implies, for example, that no set is an element of itself. 
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80 Proof: Suppose S:Setsτ and therefore ∃[α:O] S:Setsατ. 
     Proof by ordinal induction on  
           P[β:O]:Proposition1  ≡ ∀[X∈S] X:Setsβτ 
    Assume: (∀[β<α:O] ∀[X∈S] X:Setβτ)  ⇨  ∀[X∈S] X:Setsατ 
Show:  ∀[X∈S] X:Setsατ 
Assume: X∈S 
Show X:Setsατ 
Proof by cases on α 
1. X:Sets0τ 
X:Booleanτ 
       2.   ∀[α:O] Setsατ =  SetSetsα-1τ   
              X:Setsα-1τ QED by induction hypothesis 
       3.  ∀[α:LimitO] ∃[β<α,Y:Setsβτ] X∈Y 
              QED by induction hypothesis 
81 Proof: Suppose S:Setsτ and therefore ∃[α:O] S:Setsατ 
     S:Setsατ 
     Show: Booleans:Setsτ 
     Booleans:Setsα+1τ QED 
82 Proof by ordinal induction on 
          P[α:O]:Proposition1  ≡  ∀[S:Setsατ] ⋃S:Setsτ 
Assume:  ∀[β<α:O] ∀[S:Setsβτ] ⋃S:Setsτ     
Show:  ∀[S:Setsατ] ⋃S:Setsτ 
Assume:  S:Setsατ 
Show:  ⋃S:Setsτ    
∀[X:Setsτ]  X∈⋃S ⇔  ∃[Y∈S] X∈Y   
∀[X:Setsτ]  X∈⋃S ⇔  ∃[β<α:O,Y:Setsβτ] X∈Y  
∀[X:Setsτ]  X∈⋃S ⇒ X:Setsτ    
        QED by definition of Setsτ 
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83 Suppose f:SetsτSetsτ and S:Setsτ 
   Show Imageτ[f, S]:Setsτ 
Proof by ordinal induction on  
   P[α:O] ⇔ S:Setατ ⇒ Imageτ[f, S]:Setsτ 
    Suppose ∀[β<α:O] S:Setβτ ⇒ Imageτ[f, S]:Setsτ 
   Show S:Setατ ⇒ Imageτ[f, S]:Setsτ 
   Suppose  S:Setατ 
   Show Imageτ[f, S]:Setsτ 
    ∀[y:Setsτ]  y:Imageτ[f, S] ⇔ ∃[x∈S] f[x]=y 
   Show ∀[y:Setsτ]  y∈Imageτ[f, S] ⇒ y:Setsτ 
    Suppose y:Setsτ   y∈Imageτ[f, S] 
    Show y:Setsτ 
    ∃[x∈S] f[x]=y because y∈Imageτ[f, S] 
        ∃[β<α:O] x:Setsβτ because x∈S and S:Setsατ 
    Imageτ[f, x]:Setsτ by induction hypothesis 
   Show f[x]:Setsτ   
    Suppose z∈f[x] 
        Show z:Setsτ 
    z∈Setsτ because z∈f[x] and Imageτ[f, x]:Setsτ 
    f[x]:Setsτ   
    y:Setsτ  because f[x]=y 
84 [Mizar; Matuszewski1 and Rudnicki: 2005; Naumowicz and Artur 
Korniłowicz 2009; Naumowicz 2009] 
85 Note that this proof is fundamentally different from the categoricity proof in 
[Martin 2015]. 
86 Prove by ordinal rank on s1,s2:Setsτ 
87 For every type there is a larger type, i.e.., ∀[τ1::]  ∃[τ2::]  τ1⋤τ2 
88 There is no universal type.  Instead, Type is parameterized, e.g., 
Boolean:TypeBoolean and ℕ:Typeℕ 
89 True≠False, True:Boolean, and False:Boolean 
     ∀[x:Boolean] x=True  x=False 
90 O is the type of ordinals 
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91 Act is the type of Actors 
92 expression of type τ. The following axiom holds: 
 ∀[τ::,t:Termτ]  t ::τ 
93 expression of type τ. The following axiom holds: 
 ∀[τ::, e:Expressionτ]  e::τ 
94 Λτ is the type of lambda procedures over τ 
95 string of type τ. The following axiom holds: 
 ∀[τ::,s:Stringτ]  s::τ 
96 type of type τ 
97 ∀[τ::]  τ:Typeτ 
98 PropositionanOrder is the parametrized type consisting of type 
Proposition parametrized by anOrder. 
99 Discrimination of τ1 and τ2 
   For i=1,2  
 If x:τi, then ((τ1⦶τ2)[x]):(τ1⦶τ2) and x=((τ1⦶τ2)[x])↓τi.  
 ∀[z:τ] z:τ1⦶τ2 ⇔ ∃[x:τi] z=(τ1⦶τ2)[x] 
100 type of 2-element list with first element of type τ1 and with second element 
of type τ2 
101 Type of computable nondeterministic procedures from τ1 into τ2. 
If f:([τ1]→τ2) and x:τ1, then f∎[x]:τ2. The following holds: 
       ∀[f:([ℕ]→ℕ)] ∃[aString:(StringExpression[ℕ]→ℕ)] f =  aString   
   Furthermore, if e:Expression[τ1]→τ2 with no free variables, then 
e:[τ1]→τ2). 
102 Type of functions from τ1 into τ2. If f:τ2
𝛕1  and x:τ1, then f[x]:τ2. 
103 ∀[x:τ]  x:τ∋| P ⇔ P[x] 
For example,  
     ∀[τ::, X:BooleanBoolean
τ
] ∪X ≡ τ∋| λ[y:τ] ∃[Z:Booleanτ] ZXyZ 
104 if p then 1  else 2 
105 x1 is a subtype of x2, i.e.,  ∀[x:τ1] x:τ2 
106 The proposition that x is a type 
107 1, … and n-1  infer n 
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108 The following hold: 
 (⊨ℕ ) ⇔ (⊨ℕ )  (⊨ℕ ) 
 (⊨ℕ ) ⇔ (⊨ℕ )  (⊨ℕ ) 
 (⊨ℕ ⇨) ⇔ (⊨ℕ ) ⇨ (⊨ℕ ) 
 (⊨ℕ ) ⇔ ⊨ℕ  
 (⊨ℕ ∀[x:ℕ] p[x]) ⇔ ∀[x:τ] ⊨ℕ p[x] 
 (⊨ℕ ∃[x:ℕ] p[x]) ⇔ ∃[x:τ] ⊨ℕ p[x] 
109 mutually recursive definitions of functions f1 to n   
110 mutually recursive definitions of variables x1 to n  
111 mutually recursive definitions of functions f1 to n   
112 mutually recursive definitions of variables x1 to n  
113 The type of ⦅p[x]⦆ means that the Y fixed point construction cannot be used 
to construct sentences for “self-referential” propositions in Direct Logic. 
114 Also, as a special case, ⦅p[x]⦆:SentenceanOrder114 where 
p:ConstantExpressionSentenceanOrderτ 
115 Sentences are both Terms and Expressions in order to facilitate writing 
functions and procedures, respectively, over terms. 
116 The type of “x” means that the Y fixed point construction cannot be used to 
construct strings for “self-referential” propositions in Direct Logic. 
117 A Sentences is both a Term and an Expression in order to facilitate writing 
functions and procedures, respectively, over terms. 
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119 mutually recursive definitions of variables x1 to n  
120 mutually recursive definitions of functions f1 to n   
121 mutually recursive definitions of variables x1 to n  
